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1. The Fourth Amendment  to the United States Constitution reads:
The righ t of the  people to be s ecur e in t heir  per sons , houses , paper s , and
effects, against  unr easonable sear ches and seizur es, shall not be violated,
and no Warr ant s sha ll issue, bu t  u p on  p robable cause , suppor t ed  by Oa th
or  affirma tion, a nd pa rt icular ly describin g th e pla ce t o be  sea rched , and  the
pe r sons or things to be seized.
U.S. CO N S T . am en d. I V.
2. Ka tz v. United  St at es,  389 U .S. 3 47, 3 57 (19 67). F or t he  pu rp ose of
simp licity, this article discusses only searches and purposely omits any discu ssi on of
seizures. The F ourt h Ame ndm ent  does not  dist inguish be tween  a  sea rch  and  a  s ei zu re
in  re lat ion  to the cons tit ut iona l pr ote ction s a fforde d a  crim ina l de fen da nt –bot h a re
considered un rea sona ble if condu cted w ith out  a wa rr an t. S ee id . Th e a ut hor
recognizes, however, that  ther e is a difference between t he l e ga l  s t a nda rd  for
de t e r m in ing when a  search h as occurred versus t he sta ndar d for determining wh en
a  seizu re h as occur red . S ee Texa s v. Br own, 460  U.S. 7 30, 747 (1983) (Ste vens , J .,
concur r ing ) (noting that a  search protects citizens’“inter est  in  main ta in ing  persona l
priva cy” wh ile a  sei zur e pr ote cts  an  ind ivid ua l’s “inte re st  in r et ain ing  poss ess ion of
proper ty”); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (recognizing th at
a  s ea rch  occurs  w h en  the police invade an area  where the defendant has a
“reasonable expecta tion of priva cy”) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S . a t 360 ) (Har lan , J .,
c on c u r r ing); Un ite d St at es v . Men den ha ll, 44 6 U .S. 5 44, 5 54 (19 80) (“[A] per son  ha s
been  ‘seized’ wit hin  th e m ea nin g of th e F our th  Ame nd me nt  only  if, in  view  of all of
the circumstan ces surroun ding the incident, a r easonable person would ha ve believed
tha t  he  wa s n ot fr ee t o lea ve.”). Th e U ta h S up re me  Cou rt r ecen t ly  di scussed the
poten t ia l differen ce betw een  a cons ent  sea rch  an d consen t se izure and w he the r  to
draw an y dist inction  betw een  th e tw o. See infra note 4.
3. S ee, e.g., United Sta tes v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good faith exception) ;
Sou th  Dak ota v . Op p er m a n , 428  U. S. 3 64 (1 976 ) (in ven tor y se ar ch e xcep ti on );
Coolidge v. New H am psh ire, 403 U .S. 443 (1971) (plain view e xception); Chim el v.
Californ ia , 395 U.S. 752  (1969) (search  inciden t t o arr est e xception);  War den v.
Hayden , 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstan ces exception); Carr oll v. United
States,  267 U.S. 132 (1925) (aut omobile exception). For a deta iled list of the m any
recognized exceptions, s ee Cr aig M. Br adle y, Two Mode ls  of  t he Four th  Amendmen t,
83 MICH . L. RE V. 1468, 1473-74 (1985). Because of the man y excep tion s  to the
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THIRD -PARTY CONSEN T UN D E R T H E  UN I TE D
STATES AND UT AH  CONSTITUTIONS: SHOU LD UTAH
AD OP T  TH E  F E DE RAL  STANDARD?
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 A sea rch  conducted  withou t  a  w a r r a nt is gener ally “per  se
un rea sonable” under  t he  Four th Amendment 1 to th e Unit ed
Sta tes  Con st it u t ion .2 The Un ited Sta tes Su prem e Court, how-
ever, has recognized several exceptions tha t  just ify a
war rantless  sea rch .3 Consen t by t he p ers on t o be sea rch ed is
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war ran t requirement, J ustice Scalia has a rgued  th at  th e Fou rt h Ame ndm ent  is
“bas ica lly unr ecognizable.” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia , J .,
con cur ri ng ).
When  the governm ent conducts a wa rra ntless sea rch un der one of the recognized
exceptions, i t  mus t  st i ll  comply with  the  “reasonablenes s” p rong  of  the  Four th
Amendmen t . S ee ST E P H E N A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J . CAPRA, AM E RI C AN  CRIM INAL
P ROCEDURE  33 (5th ed. 1996) (“When an exceptio n  t o t he wa rr an t r equir emen t is
applicable, on ly t he  re as on ab len es s r equ ir em en t m us t b e s at isfi ed .”).
4. S ee Schneckloth v. Busta mon te, 4 12 U.S. 218, 21 9 (1973). Although  Ut ah
cour t s ha ve lon g r ecogn ized  cons en t t o sear ch  as an  exception  to the  war ran t
r equ ir emen t , it  i s n o t  necess ar ily t ru e t ha t con sen t t o seize is li ke wis e a n e xcep tion .
The Ut ah  Su pr em e Cou rt  ha d a n op por tu nit y to d ist ing uis h b et wee n con sen t  t o
sea rch  and consent t o seize as an exception to the warr ant  requirem ent bu t declined
to draw an y distinction. The Court held:
Inasmuch  as  the  r igh t  aga ins t  un lawful  searches  and the right against
un lawful seizures are coupled within the same constitu tion al pr ovision, it
is only  logica l th at  if a p er son  could  exp re ssl y cons en t t o on e , h e  or  she
shou ld be  ab le  to consen t  to  t h e othe r. Wh erea s we h ave pr eviously h eld
tha t  cons en t is  an  excep tion  to t he  wa rr an t r equ ir em en t in  th e ca se of
searches, we now hold that th e consent is likewise an exception in the case
of sei zur es.  In  oth er  wor ds,  a w ar ra nt les s se izu re  of pr oper ty i s va lid if d one
pur suan t to and with in the scope of voluntar y consent .
S t a t e v. One H un dred  Seven ty-Fiv e  T h ou s a n d Eight H undr ed Dollars, 942 P.2d 343,
347S48 (Ut ah  199 7) (cit at ion s om it te d).
5. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219.
6. S ee infra  Par t II.B.
7. S ee Un ited Stat es v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (holding that  consent
is val id if “obt ain ed fr om a  th ir d-pa rt y wh o poss ess ed com mon  au th orit y ove r  . .  . t he
premises  or effects sought to be inspected”). For a more det ailed discu ssi on of
comm on aut hority see infra  Par t II.B.3.
8. 497 U. S. 1 77 (1 990 ).
9. S ee id . at 186.
one su ch exce pt i on .4 “It is . . . well settled t ha t one of the
specifically es tabli sh ed  exce pt ion s t o the r equ i remen t s of bot h  a
war ran t an d probable cau se is  a  sear ch th at  is condu cted
pursuan t to conse nt .”5 Th e is su e, t hen , is  wh o is  au thor ized to
give va lid consen t  to sea rch  the  de fendan t ’s  p roper ty—is the
cr imin a l defendant  alone aut horized or ma y third part ies also
give valid consent ?
A line  of Su pr em e Cour t  de cis ion s6 an swers  th is quest ion by
recognizin g tha t ,  in  add it ion  to the  cr imina l  de fendan t ,  a  th i rd
pa r ty who shares comm on  au thor i ty over  the  proper ty  wi th  the
defendan t  may a lso give  effect ive  cons en t  to a s ea rch of th e
defendan t ’s pr oper ty. 7 In  Il linois  v.  R odrigu ez ,8 t he  Supreme
Cou r t  expan ded t he t hir d-pa rt y cons ent  doctr ine by h olding
tha t  a t hird  par ty can give effective consen t  even  though  the
th ird pa r ty has  no actua l  aut hor i ty  to g ive consen t .9 As long a s
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10. S ee id .
11. S ee infra  no t e 88 and  accompanying t ext .
12. S ee, e.g., Sta te v. Lopez, 896 P .2d 889, 901 (Ha w. 1995) (rejectin g doctrin e
of apparen t aut hority); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 455, 460S61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)
(sa me); State v. Will, 885 P.2d 715, 719 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted)
(“Although  appar ent a uth ority is now sufficient under t h e  F ou r th  Amendment , ac tua l
au t h o ri t y t o  gr an t con sen t is  st ill r equ ir ed u nd er  Art icle I , se ction  9 [of th e Or egon
Const itu tion ].”) (cit at ion s om it te d).
13. The Uni ted  S ta tes Con st itu tion  act s a s a  floor, p re ven tin g th e st at es fr om
tak ing aw ay  cer ta in  fun da me nt al  ri gh ts . St at es  ar e fr ee t o give more protection un der
th eir  individual constitutional provisions than  given by the United S tat es
Cons t it u t ion . See infra note 167.
14. Article  I,  section 14 of the Utah Constitution reads:
T h e right of the people to be secure in th eir persons, houses, paper s  a nd
effect s aga inst  un rea sona ble sea rch es a nd  sei zur es s ha ll n ot b e viola te d; a nd
no war ran t  sha l l i ssue  bu t  upon proba ble ca us e su ppor te d by oa th  or
a ff irma t ion , part icularly describing the place t o be s ea rch ed,  an d t he  per son
or  thing to be seized.
UTAH  CO N S T . art . I, § 14.
15. The Utah  Supreme  Cour t has expressed a willingness to decide whether  the
Utah  Constitution affords more pro t e ct i on  th an  th e Un ited S ta tes C onst itu tion wit h
respect  to third-party consent cases; however, it  has never actua lly decided the issue
because attorn eys have failed to effectively brief and ar gue th e issu e. S ee Sta te v.
Brown , 853  P. 2d  851 , 85 4 n .1 (U t ah 1993) (stating th at even th ough the defendant
raised  a s ta te  cons tit ut ion a l  cl a im,  the cour t  w il l no t  add res s  it  because  the  de fendan t
did not ade quat ely brief the issue ; there fore, the sta te wa s unprepa red  to a rgue the
ma t t e r ). Th e U ta h C our t h as  re pea te dly r efu sed  to “en g a ge  in  a  s ta te  const i tu t iona l
an alysis  unless an argum ent for different an alyses under th e s ta te  and  federa l
cons t it u t ion s is  brie fed.” Id . (qu oti ng  St at e v.  La ffer ty , 74 9 P .2d  123 9, 1 247  n. 5 (U ta h
198 8),  aff ’d , 776 P .2d 631 (U ta h 198 9), vaca ted  on  other grou nd s su b n om . Lafferty
v. Cook, 949 F .2d 1546 (10t h Cir . 1991)); Sta te v. Ar royo, 770 P .2d 153, 154 n.1 (Utah
Ct . App. 1989) (“[A] th ree lin e conclusory s ta tem ent  as t o the  gre a t er  s cope  of  st a t e
cons t i tu t iona l protections is an insufficient briefing for us to embark on a sta te
cons t i tu t iona l an aly sis  . . . .”); see also infra Par t III.C.
t h e police officer r ea sona bly believe s t ha t t he  consen tin g pa r ty
has auth ority to give consent t o the search, regardless of
whet her  he in fact h ad su ch au th ority, the consent  is va lid.10
Many have criticized this “appar ent  au th ority” doctr ine,
viewing  it as  an  un acceptable er osion of Fourth  Amendm ent
p r otect ion s. 11 As  a  r esu lt ,  s evera l s t a t e cour t s  have  in t e rpret ed
th eir  s t a t e cons t it u t ions  to give broa der  pr otection  to crim ina l
defendan t s i n t he  a rea  of t h ird-party consent than  those
afforde d b y t he U nit ed  St a tes  Con st it u t ion .12
The Uta h Su prem e Court  ha s never  expressly decided
whet her  to incorpora te fed er a l t h ir d-p ar ty con se n t  la w in to the
st at e const itu tion 13 or  t o i nt e rpre t  t he Utah  Cons t it u t ion1 4  i n  a
way that  offers more protection to criminal defendant s.15 The
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16. Whether  there  is  (o r  should  be)  a  substantive difference between t he tw o
cons t i tu t iona l pr ovisi ons  is  a  m att er for t he U ta h Su prem e Cour t t o decide. The on ly
textual  differ en ce be tw een  th e t wo con st itu tion al p rov ision s is  one  of pu nct ua tion  an d
grammar . S ee Stat e v. Jackson , 937 P.2d 545, 548 n.2 (Ut ah  Ct. App. 1 997). Compare
U.S. CO N S T . a me nd . IV (“ The right  of the people to be secure in th eir  persons,
houses, papers, an d effects, against u nrea sonable sear ches and seizur es, shall n ot be
violated, and n o Warra nts  shall issu e, but u pon probable caus e, support ed by Oath
or  a f fi rmat ion , and  par t icu la r ly descr ibing the  p lace to be sea rched , and  the pe r sons
or  th ings t o be seized .”), with  UTAH  CO N S T . a rt . I,  § 14 (“ The right  of the p eople to
be secure in their persons, h ouses, papers a nd effects again st un reasona ble searches
and seizures shall not be violated; a n d  n o war ra nt  sha ll issue  but  upon  proba ble
cause su ppor te d by oa th  or  a f fi r m a tion, part icularly describing th e place to be
searched, an d t he  pe rs on  or  th in g t o be  se ize d.”).
17. S ta t e v. Watts,  7 50  P .2d 1 219,  1221  (Ut ah  1988 ); see also Stat e v. Dunn , 850
P.2d 1201, 1216 n .11 (Uta h 1993) (reit era tin g th at  “f ed e r a l a n d  s t a t e s ea rch  and
se izu re provis ions [ar e] ‘ident ical’”) (citi ng  St at e v.  Le e, 6 33 P .2d  48,  50 (U ta h 1 981 ));
S ta t e v. C on tr el,  886  P. 2d  107 , 11 1 (U ta h C t.  App . 19 94).
18. S ee Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n .8.
In  declining to depart in th is case from our consisten t refusa l heretofore to
i n t er pret  ar ti cle I , se cti on  14 of o ur  con st it ut ion  in  a m an ne r d iffer en t fr om
the four th  amendment  to the  federa l const i t u t ion ,  we  have  by no  means
ruled  ou t t he  pos sib ilit y of doing so in som e futu re cas e. Ind eed, choosing
to give th e Ut ah  Const itu tion a  somewh at  different  constr uction  m ay pr ove
t o be an a ppr opr iat e m et hod  for in su lat ing  th is s ta te ’s cit izen s fr om t he
vagaries  of incon sistent  inter pret ations given t o the fourth  amen dmen t by
the federal courts.
Id . The Utah Su preme Court has in fact departed from the United Sta t e s  F ou r th
Amendmen t on a few  limit ed occasion s. See infra Par t III.B.3.
19. S ee Sta te v. Bobo, 803  P. 2d 1 268 , 127 2 (U ta h C t.  App.  199 0) (“Un ti l su ch
t i m e a s  a t torneys  heed th e call of the appellate court s of this state t o more fully brief
and ar gu e t he  ap plica bilit y of th e st at e con st itu tion , we ca nn ot m ea nin gful ly pl ay ou r
pa r t in t he  jud icia l la bor at ory  of au ton omou s st at e con st itu tion al law d evelopm ent .”)
Utah Cour t h as , however , recognized  th at  given t he s imila rit y
between  the F our th  Amen dm en t  and Ar t icle  I, S ect ion  14 of t he
Utah Con st it u t ion ,16 cour t s  shou ld re fra in  from drawing
dis t inc-t ions “between  the pr otect ions a fford ed by t he  re spe ctive
cons t itu t iona l p rov is ions” and  shou ld consider  “the  protect ions
afforded  to be on e a nd  th e sa me .”17 Nevert he less,  the Utah
Cou r t  has also acknowledged th a t  th i s i s merely a  genera l
pol icy and th ere will likely be approp r ia t e  t imes  when  loca l
interests  wil l com pe l a n  in ter pr et a t ion  of th e Ut ah  Const itu tion
tha t  differs from t he con s t r u ct ion given t o the Un ited St at es
Con st it u t ion .1 8  In  an  effor t  to de ter min e whet her  the F our th
Am endment  and Utah Const i tut ion are  conterminous,  Utah
appel la t e cour t s  have  inv ited  a t torneys  to b r ie f and  a rgue
whet her  any di ffer en ce ex is t s bet ween  the s t a te a nd fed er a l
constitut ional provisions.19
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(cita tion s an d foot not es om itt ed); see also Kenneth  R. Wallentin e, Heeding the Call:
S earch  and S eizure Ju rispruden ce Under the Utah  Constitution ,  Article I, Section 14 ,
17 J . CO N T E M P . L. 267 (1991) (“Despite num erous and explicit invitations t o brief
Utah  constitut ional provisions, and a  demonst rat ed wil li n gn ess  to r each  s t a t e
cons t i tu t iona l quest ions, pr actit ioner s contin ue t o ignore t he cour ts’ admon itions. T his
del in qu en cy hi nd er s d eve lopm en t of U ta h co ns ti tu ti on al  la w.”) (foot no te s om it te d);
infra  Par t III.C.
20. Ka tz v. U ni te d S ta te s, 3 89 U .S.  347 , 35 7 (19 67).
21. Schnecklot h  v. Bu st am ont e, 41 2 U .S. 2 18, 2 22 (19 73); accord  Florida  v.
J imeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250S51 (19 91) (“[W]e h ave  long  ap pr oved  consen sua l searches
because it  is n o dou bt  re as ona ble  for t he  poli ce t o cond uct  a s e a r ch  once th ey ha ve
This  Comment  addresses the  doct r ine of th i rd-par ty consen t
and ana lyzes  whether  the  Utah  Supreme Cour t  shou ld par t
company with  the fede ra l s t anda rd . Pa r t  I I outlines  the  h is tory
and cur ren t st a te of t he la w wit h  res pe ct  to th i rd-par ty consen t
accordin g to the United Sta tes  Supreme Court. It  also
add ress es some of th e r ela tion sh ips in  wh ich a  th ird  pa rt y ha s
given valid consen t t o search  the  proper ty  of a  cr imina l
defendan t . Part  III looks at  how Uta h court s ha ve applied
federal  th ird-part y consent la w and addresses the willingness
of Uta h court s to deter mine wh eth er  t he Ut ah  an d Un ited
Sta tes  Const itut ions are conterm inous with respect to third-
pa r ty consent. Par t IV analyzes the criteria that sh ould be used
to determine whether t o formally adopt the federal stand a rd,
t hen  applies th e criteria t o critique t he federal law. T h is
Com me n t concludes  tha t  Utah  shou ld adop t  the federa l
s t anda rd with respect to third-party consent  genera lly, but
shou ld not completely incorpora te  the federa l apparen t
au thor it y sta nda rd. In stea d, Uta h sh ould adopt a  modified
version of th e appa ren t a ut hority doctrin e.
II. TH I R D -PART Y CO N S E N T  UN D E R  TH E  UN I T E D  ST A T E S
CO N S T I T U T I O N
A. Con sen t S ear ches A uth ori zed  by  th e Crim in al  Defendan t
 To fully u nd er st an d t hir d-pa rt y consen t d octrin e, on e m u st
first  unders tand the  fundamen ta l a spect s  of non-th ird -pa r ty
consen t  sea rches—those  tha t  a re  pe rsona lly au thor ized by the
cr imina l de fen da nt . As pr eviously n oted , even  though  a  se a rch
con d u ct e d w it h ou t  a  w ar r a n t  i s g en er a ll y “p er  se
unreasona ble”20 an d th us in valid, a sea rch a ut horized by
consen t is “wholly valid .”21 For the defendant’s consen t to pass constitu
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been pe rm it te d t o do s o.”).
22. S ee United  St at es v . Men den ha ll, 44 6 U .S. 5 44, 5 57 (19 80); Bu mp er  v. N ort h
Carol ina , 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (“When a prosecutor see k s  t o r e ly  upon  consen t
to justify the la wfulness of a sear ch, he ha s the  burd en  of pr oving tha t  t he  consen t
was, in fact, freely and vo lu n t a r i ly  given.”); United Sta tes v. McCurdy, 40 F.3d 1111,
1119 (10t h C ir . 19 94); U ni te d S ta te s v.  Zap at a,  997  F. 2d  751 , 75 8 (10 th  Cir . 19 93);
United  St at es  v. N ich ols on , 98 3 F .2d  983 , 98 8 (10 th  Cir . 19 93).
23. S ee Fl or ida  v. B ost ick , 50 1 U .S.  429 , 43 8 (19 91) (“ ‘Con se n t ’ t ha t  i s t he
p r od u ct  of official intimidation or har assment is not consent at all .  Citizens d o n ot
forfeit t he ir  cons t it u t iona l  r igh t s when  they a re  coerced  to comply with  a  reques t  tha t
they  would prefer to refus e.”); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225S26 (stating that  the test
for  “volun ta r in ess, ” at  lea st  in t he  cont ext  of confes sion s, is  wh et he r t he  confes sion
is a  “p roduct  of an essen tially free and un constrained choice by its ma ker” or whether
t h e “defendant’s will was overborne” in making the confession); United States v.
Glover, 104 F .3d 1570, 1 584 (10t h Cir . 1997) (“Evidence obtained by a consent-based
sea rch  is adm issible only if th e govern men t (1) produ ces clear  an d positi ve t e s t imony
tha t  the consent was un equivocal, specific, and freely given, and (2) pro ve s  t h a t  t he
consent  was given  with out d ur ess or coer cion, exp re ss or  im plie d.”); N ich olson , 983
F.2d at  988 (holdi n g t h a t  th e “gover nm en t m us t s how  th at  th er e wa s n o du re ss or
coer cion,  express or implied, that  the consent was un equivocal and spe cific, and  tha t
it  wa s fr ee ly a nd  in te llig en tl y giv en ”).
24. Mendenh all, 446 U .S. a t 5 57 (cit at ions  omi tt ed); see also S ch neckloth, 412
U.S. at 226; Un ited Sta tes v. Doyle, 129 F.3d 1372, 1377 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Whether
or  not a pa rty ha s voluntar ily consented t o a search  is a  qu es ti on of fa ct t ha t t he
dis tr ict  cour t m us t e val ua te  in v iew of t he  tot ali ty of t he  circu ms ta nce s.”); McCurdy,
40 F.3 d a t 1 119; Zapata, 997 F.2d at 758.
25. Schneckloth, 412 U .S. a t 2 26 (cit at ions  omi tt ed); accord  Mendenh all, 446
U.S. at 558S59; United St ates  v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424S25 (19 75); Glov er, 104
F.3d at 1583S84 (holding t h a t  co u r ts s hou ld lo ok a t fa ctor s s uch  as  ph ysi cal
mis tr ea tmen t, us e of viole nce , pr omi ses  or in du cem en ts , de cept ion or  t r i cke ry,  and the
menta l con dit ion  of th e d efe nd an t).
t iona l must er, the prosecution has t h e  bu r den  of p rov ing22 t ha t
t h e consent  was volunt ar ily given.23 “Th e qu es t ion  wh et her  [a
defendant ’s] consen t  .  . .  was  in  fact  volun ta ry or  was  the
product  of dur ess or coercion, express or imp lied, is to be
det er min ed by t he  tot alit y of all th e circu ms ta nces  . . . .”24
The Supr eme Cour t h as en un ciated sever al factors u nder
th i s totality of circumstances te s t  t h a t  cou r t s  may use to
dete rmine whether  a  de fendan t ’s  consen t  was  in  fact  volunta ry.
S o m e of t h e  fa ct or s  ta k e n  in t o a ccou n t  h a ve  in clu d e d t h e you th
of th e a ccuse d, h is la ck of ed uca tio n , or h i s  l ow in t e l l i gence ,
t h e la ck o f a n y ad vice t o th e a ccus ed  of his  cons tit u tion al
r igh t s ,  th e le n gt h  of det en tion , th e r ep ea te d a n d p rolon ge d
n a t u r e  of th e qu es tion in g, a n d  t h e  use  o f  phys i ca l  pun i shmen t
such  a s  t he  dep r iva t ion  o f food  o r  s leep .25
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26. S ee Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 ( st a t i n g tha t none of the consent cases
cited by t he  cour t “t ur ne d on  th e pr ese nce  or absence  of a s ing le con tr ollin g cri te ri on;
each  re flect ed  a ca re ful  scr ut in y of a ll t he  su rr ou nd in g cir cum st an ces ”).
27. 412 U. S. 2 18 (1 973 ).
28. I d . a t  227; see also Flor ida v. Rod rigu ez, 469 U .S. 1, 6S7 (19 84) (“[T]h e S t a te
need  no t  prove  tha t  a  de fendan t  cons en t ing  to a  s ea rch  knew tha t  he  had the  r igh t
to wit hh old [] con sen t, .  . . kn owledge of the r ight to refuse consent could be taken
in to account in det erm ining whet her or  not a consen t wa s ‘volun ta ry. ’”); LARRY E.
H OLTZ, CON TE MP ORA RY CRIMINAL P ROCEDURE  § 3.6 at 337S38 (5 th  ed . 19 97).
29. Miranda  v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444S45 (1 966 ).
[T]h e prosecution may not u se stat ement s, whether  excu lpa tor y or
inculpa tory,  stem min g from cus todia l  in t errogation of the defendant u nless
it  demonstr ates t he use of procedural safeguar ds effective t o  se cu r e  the
privilege  aga ins t s elf-in crim ina tion . . . . P ri or t o an y que st ioni ng , th e pe rs on
must  be warned t hat  he h as a  righ t  t o r ema in  s il en t ,  t ha t  any  st a t ement
he does  make may be used as e vidence a gain st h im, a nd t ha t h e ha s a r ight
to the pr esence of an at torney, either reta ined or appointed. The defendant
may wa ive  effectuat ion of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowin gly and in telligently.
Id . (em ph as is a dde d) (footn ote s om it te d); cf. Schneckloth,  412 U.S. at 237 (“Almost
withou t exception, the r equiremen t of a knowing and int elligent waiver has been
applied only  to t hos e r igh ts  wh ich t he  Con st itu tion  guara ntee s  to a  c r imina l
de fendan t in  or de r t o pr es er ve a  fai r t ri al .”).
30. P ro fessor s Saltzburg and Capr a have suggested “a very straight-forward,
power fu l argum ent in su pport” of the Schneckloth holding:
The Four th Amendmen t  pro t ec t s a gai ns t u nr ea son ab le s ea rch es; p ri or
decis ions  indica t e  t ha t  where  the governmen t wants  to u se  powe r t o force
a  search and se izur e, th e wa rr an t cla us e is  th e ba sic d efin iti on of
None of t he  factor s  li st ed a re  independen t ly  di spos it i ve;
instead, a  judge should  ana lyze  a ll of t hem  t ogethe r  t o
deter mine wh eth er a  const itut ional violation h as occur red. 26
One factor, in part icular, has received conside r a ble
at ten tion —kn owledge  by t he defen da nt  of hi s r igh t  to refu se
consen t . Sp ecifi ca lly , some h ave a rgu ed  tha t  a  conse n t ing
crim ina l defen da nt  mu st  first  kn ow th at  he h as  th e r ight  t o
r e fuse conse n t  before h is  conse n t  is  va lid . Th e S upr em e Cour t
address ed th i s i ssue in  Schneckloth v. Bustam onte27 and
concluded  tha t  “[w]h i le  knowledge of the r igh t  t o re fuse consen t
is one fa ctor  to be  taken  in to account , the government  need not
establish such k nowledge as t he s ine qua non  of an effective
consen t .”28 Thu s, un like th e Miranda29 lin e of ca se s in  wh ich  a
cr imina l de fen da nt  can  effect ive ly waive  h is  r igh t s t o counsel
and  remain  si len t if he h as  given bot h a  kn owing and  volunta ry
waiver,  Schneckloth  and it s p rogen y expr es sly r efu te t h is  not ion
for  cons e nt  cases.30 As  a  resu lt ,  volun ta r iness  is  the touchs tone
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reasonableness; but where the government, rat her tha t using  coercive power
to force and seize, asks people for their per mission to conduct  a  s ea rch ,  t he
war ran t clause is inapplicable; and when th e w a r r a n t clause is inapplicable,
the basic test is r easona ble n e ss  u nder  th e cir cum st an ces . An d a  se ar ch
pur suan t to volunt ary consent is r easonable.
S ee SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra  note 3, at  350.
31. The volu nt ar ine ss s ta nd ar d, ba sed  up on  t he totality of the circumstances,
is a d ifficult  sta nda rd t o mea sur e. “ ‘Th e n oti on of “volu nt ar in es s,” Mr . J us ti ce
Fra nkfurt er  once wrote,  ‘is its elf an  am phib ian .’” Schneck lo th , 412  U .S . a t  224 . Due
to th e am biguit y  in h erent in t he voluntariness st andar d, some have argued tha t the
S u p re m e Court  shou ld move a way from  th e volunt ar ines s s ta nd ar d in  fav or  of a
b r igh t -l ine ru l e s imi la r  t o t ha t  adop ted in  Mi ra n d a.  In f ac t , t h i s was  the  a rgumen t
assert ed in  Schn eckloth . The Su prem e Cour t h as r efused  to adopt  a br ight -line ru le
s imila r t o  Miranda,  however, because “[t]he considerations that  informed th e  C ou r t ’s
ho ld ing in  Miranda ar e sim ply ina pplicab le” to consen t cas es. Id . at 246.
Th e Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure requires Miranda-type wa rn ings
to be given to the consenting par ty before the police ca n  conduc t  a  consen t  sea rch .
The war nin g requ ires t he police to in form t he conse nt er t ha t h e ha s th e righ t t o
refuse consen t or  limit  th e consen t a fter  a se ar ch h as b egun . S ee 1 J O H N WE S L E Y
H ALL, J R ., SE A R CH AND SEIZURE , § 8:2, at 383 (2d ed. 1991). The Model Code reads
in  r e levan t  pa r t :
(2) RE Q U I RE D WARNING TO P E R S O N S  NO T  I N  CUSTODY OR UNDER AR R E S T .
Befor e under taki n g a  s e a rch under  the pr ovisions of this Article, an officer
p resen t sha ll  in fo rm the indivi dual whose consent is sought  tha t he is un der
n o obligation to give such consent  and t hat  anyth ing found m ay be t aken
and used in evidence.
Id . at § 8:2, at 383 n.10 (quoting ALI MO D E L CO D E  O F  P RE -ARRAI G N M E N T  P ROCEDURE
§ SS  240 .2(2 ) (197 5)).
Utah  defendants h a v e  a lso advanced  the a rgument  tha t  a  Miranda-ty pe p olice
warn ing sh oul d be  iss ue d p ri or t o a con se nt  se ar ch.  S ee, e.g., Stat e v. Bobo, 803 P.2d
1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Bobo, th e defend an t pr oposed th at  th e following
Miranda-type wa rn in g sh oul d be  give n t o pe rs ons  as ke d t o cons en t t o a s ea rch :
You ha ve t he  rig ht  to r efuse perm ission for a ny sea rch. If you wit hh old
consen t , we would be required to requ est a sea rch warr ant  from a judge,
wh ich  warran t would only issue if we could show the judge probable cause
to beli eve  [th e it em  sou gh t] wi ll be  foun d. I f you con sen t t o th e sea rch,  any
incr imina t ing evid en ce foun d ca n a nd  will b e u sed  aga ins t you .
Id . at 1272 n.3. The court r ejected the ar gumen t in favor of the fede r a l  st a n d a rd. S ee
id . at 1272S73.
of cons en t  doct r in e, a nd k nowle dge of t he r ight to refuse
consen t  i s jus t  one  of many  factors  used  to dete rmine
voluntar iness.31
These cons idera t ions  r ep r esen t  t he backdrop  the Supreme
Cou r t  has  used to cra ft  i ts  t h ird-p a r t y consen t  doct r ine.
However , th e focus in t his a rea  ha s not been  on  whe ther  the
criminal  defendant has  volun ta r ily consen ted; instead, cou r t s
have addr essed issu es such a s whet her  th e third party
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32. S ee infra  Par t II.B.2.
33. S ee infra  Par t II.B.3.
34. S ee 3 WAYNE  R. LAF AVE , SE A R C H  A N D  SE IZURE  § 8.3(a), at 714 (3d ed. 1996)
(“Although  third-par ty consents ha ve been litigated in th e lower  cour t s w ith
consider able  fre qu en cy a nd  ha ve b een  th e s ub ject  of repea ted  a t t en t ion  by lega l
commenta tor s , the United Stat es Supreme Court has h a d  r ema rk ab ly lit tle  to s ay on
the su bje ct. ”).
35. 365 U. S. 6 10 (1 961 ).
36. 497 U. S. 1 77 (1 990 ).
37. S ee infra  Par t II.B.1.
38. S ee infra  Par t II.B.2.
volunta r il y consen ted to the  sea rch 32 or  whethe r  t he  th ird pa r ty
who au th orized the sea rch  had  common au thor i ty over  the
pr oper ty. 33
B. T hird-Pa rt y Consen t U nder the Un it ed  S ta tes  Con st it u ti on
 Alth ough  t h ir d -p a r t y con s en t  doctr ine ha s received much
exposure  by lega l comm ent at ors a nd  ha s been  frequ ent ly
litigated  in  the low er  cour ts ,  the U nit ed  St a tes  Su pr em e Cour t
has addressed  th ird -part y conse nt  doct r in e in  ju st  a  handfu l of
cases over the past  forty years.34 L ike  many othe r  Four th
Amendment  doct rines, the Court ’s handling of third-part y
consen t  doct r ine ha s been  an  evolut iona ry p rocess, be ginn ing in
the ear ly 1960s w ith  Chapm an v. United States35 and
cu lmina t ing in  the contr oversia l Il linois  v.  R odrigu ez36 de cis ion .
Alth ough  the Court seemed t o a ccept  t he  not ion  tha t  a  t h ird
pa r ty could give cons en t t o a se ar ch t ha t w ould b e effective
aga ins t  a criminal defendant , i t s ca ses  il lu s t r a t e t ha t  t he Cour t
has ha d a difficult t ime deciding on a tes t or r at ionale to govern
third-party consent cases.
Dur ing th e ea rly year s of th ird-par ty consent  development ,
the Cou r t  rejected  not ion s of p roper ty  law as  a  theore t ica l bas is
for  va lid  th ir d-p ar ty con se n t ; in st ea d,  the Cour t  reli ed  on a
m ixtu re of agency  law and Four th  Amendmen t  policy
cons idera t ions to invalid at e sea rch es a ut hor ized by a
land lord/innkeeper .37 Dur ing  th is  same period, the court  also
rea ffirm ed the ba sic requ ir em en t  tha t  th ir d-p ar ty con se n t  is  not
valid  i f the  consen t ing par ty involun ta r ily au thor izes  the
search .38 By the  mid-1970s t he Cou r t  fi na l ly  a r t icu la ted  the
modern  te st  to de te rm ine  th e valid ity of th ird -par ty consen t .
The test focuses on whether t he third par ty and t he  de fendan t
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39. S ee infra  Par t II.B.3.
40. S ee infra Par t II.B.4.
41. 376 U. S. 4 83 (1 964 ).
42. S ee H ALL, supra  not e 31, § 8:6, a t 3 89 (“ The first rea l third-part y consent
s e a r ch  case  decide by t he Cou rt  was  Cha pma n v. U nit ed St at es in  1961 . . .  .  The
Cou rt  la te r a rt icu la te d t he  con st it ut ion al  ba se s of t h ird-part y consent  in St oner  v.
Californ ia  . . . . ”).
43. In  Chapman , t he own er/lan dlord of a r ent al h ome st opped by t o invite h is
new ten an t t o att end  chu rch  with  him . 365 U.S . 610 (1961). After  ar rivin g, he
smelled a  “s t ron g odo r  of w his key  mash  com in g from  the h ou se. ” Id. at 612. After
de termin ing tha t  t he  t enan t  was no t  home,  t he owner  called the police and gave t hem
per mi ssi on  to enter  the h om e thr ough an u nlocked window and search for evidence.
Re ly ing upon  the  consen t , t he police  conduc ted  a  war ran t l es s  sea rch  and  ga the red
evid en ce to  convict  t he  t enan t  of  federa l  li quor la w violation s. See id.  at 610S12.
Stoner,  on the other  han d, involved consent  by a h otel cler k t o sea rch  th e r oom of
one  of his gues ts. Th e police appr oached t he cler k becau se of the ir  susp ic ion  tha t  an
arm ed robber was staying at th e hotel and asked the  c le rk  for p er mi ss ion  to s ea rch
the sus pect’s room. The  clerk ga ve per miss ion an d th e police conducted a warra ntless
sea rch , gat her ing evid ence u sed t o convict th e gue st. S ee S ton er,  376 U.S. at 484S86.
44. S ee S ton er, 376  U.S . at  490; Chapman , 365 U.S. at 617S18.
45. Pr ofess or  La F ave ar gues t ha t t hes e cases , especially Chapman , tell “us litt le
abou t  what th e theoretical basis for third-party consent is, b u t  [do] say some th ing
abou t  wha t it  is not .” LAF AVE , supra  note 34, § 8.3(a), at 715.
s h a re common aut hority over the property to be searched.3 9
Fin ally,  in  it s m ost  recen t  opin ion  on the i ss u e,  the  Supreme
Cou r t  expanded the  mod er n  ru le by form ally a dopt ing t he
doct r ine of apparen t  au thor i ty to va lid a te a sea rch a ut horized
by an  individua l  who did n ot h ave  act ua l au th orit y to consen t  t o
the  sea rch .40
1 . Early development
Chapman  an d S toner v. California41 r epresen t  t he  Supreme
Cou r t ’s first subst ant ial third-party consent cases.42 I n  both
cases, a  lan dlord /inn kee per  gave  the p olice  pe rmission  to se a rch
the residence of a tenant/guest and eviden ce  ga thered  from the
warra ntless sear ches was u sed t o convict th e defendant s.43 The
Cou r t  wa s t he n ca lled u pon t o decide wh et he r t he  consen t b y a
land lord/innkeeper  was effective against the defendan t
t enan t/guest . In both cases, the Court  held that t he r esp ective
sear ches violat ed t he  defen da nt ’s F our th  Amen dm en t r ight  to
be  free  from an  unrea son able  se a rch .44
Two common ideas tha t  appear  th roughout  the  Chapman
and Stoner decisions shaped the ear ly stage of third-party
consen t  doct r i n e.45 Firs t, th e Supr eme Cour t soun dly rejected
the idea  tha t  t r adi t ion a l prope r ty la w d oct r in e s s h ou ld pla y a
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46. S ee Chapman ,  365 U.S. at 616 (arguing that  because a la nd lor d  has  an
absolu t e righ t t o ent er r ent ed pr emis es to view wh eth er a  ten an t is comm itt ing
waste,  th e la nd lor d m ay  de leg at e t ha t r igh t t o la w enfo rce me nt  officer s); S ton er, 376
U.S. at  488 (argu ing t ha t st at e law gi ves hote l propr ietors  “blanket  au th ority t o
au th orize  th e p olice  to s ea rch  th e r oom s of t he  ho te l’s gu es ts ”).
47. Chapman , 365 U.S. at 617 (quoting J ones v. United  Stat es, 362 U.S. 257,
266S67 (196 0) overruled on other grounds by Uni ted States  v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(198 0)); see al so S ton er, 376 U.S. at 488.
48. S ee infra  text a ccompa nying note 71.
49. Chapman , 365 U.S. at 616S17 (quot ing J ohn son v. United S tates, 337 U.S.
10, 14 (1 948 )).
50. S ton er, 376 U.S. at 490.
role in det er m i ning whether the th ird-part y consent was valid.
The gove r n ment  in bot h ca ses a rgu ed t ha t p roper ty la w
th eories just ified th e consen t by t he la nd lord/inn keeper .46 In
both  cases , the  cour t  r esponded  by  sta t ing tha t
it  i s  un necessa ry a n d  i l l-ad vised  to im por t in to t he  law
s u r r ou n d in g the  con s tit u tion al  rig h t t o be fr ee  from
un reason able  sea rches  an d  se i zu res  sub t l e  d is t inc t ions ,
deve loped  an d r efin ed  by t h e com m on  la w in  evolv in g t h e bod y
of p r iva t e  p r ope r ty  l aw  wh ich ,  more  th an  a lmos t  any  o th e r
b r a n ch  of law, h as  bee n s ha ped  by d ist inct ions  wh ose va lidit y
is  largely h is tor ical .  .  . .  [W]e ough t  n ot  t o  bo w  t o t h e m  in  t h e
fair  adm in i s t r a t i on  of th e cr im in al  la w. T o do s o wou ld n ot
com por t  w it h  ou r  j u st ly  p r ou d  cl a im  o f t h e  pr oce d u r a l
p ro tec t ions  acco rded  to  those  cha rged  wi th  c r ime . 47
Alth ough  t h e  Su p r em e  Cou r t ’s  th ird-par ty consen t
ju r i sp rudence has chan ged over  the  years , the  Cour t  has
ret ained  the  idea  tha t  p roper ty  law is  an  inva lid theore t ica l
basis for third -part y consent la w.48
The second  common fea tu re found  in  both  Chapman  a nd
Stoner is the concern tha t if the Court allowed a warra ntless
sea rch  based on t he consent  of a lan dlord/innkeep er, it would be
reducing the Fourth  Amendment “to a nullity and leave
[t enan ts ’] homes secur e only in the discret ion  of [lan dlord s].”49
In  short , the constit ut ional right  to be free from unr easonable
sear ches would “disap pear  if it wer e left to depend  upon  the
un fetter ed d iscre t ion”50 of an in dividu a l fr om whom the
defendan t  ren t s h i s l iv ing quar ter s . The Cour t s eem ed t o ar rive
a t  th i s conclusion  due t o its incorpora tion of agency prin ciples:
Four th Amendment  r igh t s  a re persona l  in  na tu re  and only the
poten t ia l defendant  can wa ive the m b y consen t. E ven  th ough
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51. Id . at 489.
52. Id .
53. LAF AVE , supra  note 34, § 8.3(a), at 717 (arguing th at nea rly all third-party
consent  searches would be invalidated if courts inter pret ed S ton er t o  say  tha t  t he re
must  be an actu al principal-agent relat ionship between t h e de fendan t  and  th ird  pa r ty
because agency principles are “generally inapplicable to the s i tu at ion s wi th in  wh ich
most search a nd seizure issu es arise”) (quoting Steven H . Bowen, Comm ent , Relevance
of the Absent Party’s Whereabouts in Third-Par t y C on s en t  S earch es,  53 B.U. L. RE V.
1087, 110 4 (19 73)).
54. S ee supra  Pa rt  II. A; see also J O S H U A DR E S S LE R , UNDERSTANDING CRIM INAL
P ROCEDURE , § 89[A], a t 1 78; H ALL, supra  no te  31,  § 8:1 , a t 3 82 (“ The  u lt ima te
qu est ion  in  any consen t  search  is  whether  the  consen t  was volunt a ry .”); id . at  §§
8:12S8:30.
55. 391 U. S. 5 43 (1 968 ).
56. S ee id . at 544S46.
waiver  can  come “eith er d irect ly or  t h rough  an  agen t ,”51 t he
Cou r t  concluded tha t th e police had no basis t o believe tha t t he
land lord/innkeeper  was “au thorized  by t he [defen da nt ] to
per mit  th e police to se ar ch t he  [defend an t’s] room.”52
Thus by th e m id-1960s , th e  Su p r eme Cour t h ad r ejected
t rad it iona l pr opert y law d octrin es a s a n a ppr opria te  t ool to
eva luate th ird-par ty consent  cases. Inst ead, t he Court  focused
on Four th  Amendm ent  policies, based  on a gen cy th eories , to
invalidat e consen t wh en it a ppear ed tha t  the  consen t  depend ed
upon the  di scre t ion  of a  th ir d  pa r t y who was not  au thor i zed to
wa ive the defendant ’s r igh t s.  At  the t im e, s ome com men ta tors
ar gued th at  th ese cases t aken  together  “sounded  the dea th
kn ell for a lmost  all t hir d-pa rt y consen t s ea rch es.”53
2. V olu n ta riness : a required  as pect  of th ird-pa rt y con sen t
The touchs tone  of t r ad it i ona l consen t  doct r ine is
voluntar iness.54 Un t il  Bum per v. North Carolina,55 howeve r, t he
Supreme Cour t h ad  never  expr essly  in corpora ted the
volun ta r iness s t andard found  in  t r ad it i ona l consen t  ca ses  in to
th ird -pa r ty consen t cases. Th e defenda n t  in  Bum per,  t he
sus pect in a  ra pe pr osecut ion, lived with  h is  grandmothe r  in
her  home. The police ar rived at  th e home t o sear ch for evidence,
presen t ed a sea rch wa rr an t t o the defenda nt ’s gra ndm other ,
and asked  for  permiss ion  to en ter  the  home to conduct  the
search . Sh e complied w ith  t he officers’ requ est a nd a llowed
them  to en ter  her  home. T he s ea rch  res u lt ed  in  the d iscover y of
evide nce used  to conv ict  the  de fendan t .56 When the defendant
moved to have the evidence suppressed , the  prosecu tor  told the
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57. S ee id . at 546 n .7.
58. Id . at 548.
59. S ee id . at 550.
60. S ee id .
61. Id . at 548S49.  Th e Cou rt  st at ed t ha t “[w]h er e t he re  is coe rci on t he re  can no t
be consen t.” Id . at 550.
62. S ee id . a t 5 48 (“W h e n  a  prosecu tor s eeks  to re ly upon cons ent  to just ify the
lawfulness of a sear ch, he h as t he bu rden  of proving th at  th e cons en t w as , in  fact ,
freely  an d vol un ta ri ly gi ven .”).
63. 394 U. S. 7 31 (1 969 ).
t r i a l cour t  tha t  the  st a te  was not  re ly ing  on  the  sea rch  war ran t
to ju s t ify the  sea rch ; inst ead , th e pr osecut or r elied exclus ively
on the  consen t  gr a n t ed by the d efendan t’s gra ndm other .57 The
i ss u e before t he S upr em e Cour t  wa s w het her  “a s ea rch  can  be
justified as la wful on the ba sis of consen t  w h en  t ha t  ‘consen t ’
has been  give n  only a ft er  the offici a l con du ct ing  the sea rch  has
as ser te d t ha t h e poss ess es a  wa rr an t.”58
The Supr eme Court  incorporat ed the voluntar iness
s t anda rd into th ird -pa r ty consen t cases t o hold that  un der
these fact s , t he  consen t  was not  volun ta ry  and  thus  the
evide nce gat her ed from the  sea rch  shou ld have been
suppressed.59 The Court  rea soned th at  when  an  officer pr esent s
a  search warra nt t o the occupant  of a home, he is essen tia lly
saying th at  th e occupan t h as n o right t o resist t he s ea rch .60
Because t he  occupan t  faces no choice  whe ther  t o g ran t  consen t ,
the consent cannot be considered “freely an d volun ta rily
given.”61 Bum per, t hen , s t ands  for  the pr opos it ion  tha t  the
prosecu tion  mus t  prove tha t  t he th ird  pa r ty voluntar i ly
consen ted  to th e sear ch without  an y coercive techniqu es
employed by the police.62
3. Modern third-party consent ana lysis
Even  a ft e r  Bum per, t he Cour t  st ill  had n ot  clearly
ar ticulat ed a  speci fi c t e st  or  r a t iona le t o be used in all third-
pa r ty consen t  cases . Ins tead , th ere wer e a  ha ndful of disjointed
cases that  suggested tha t as long as t h e  con sen t ing th ird  pa r ty
was an  agen t  of t he  de fendan t  and  voluntarily  consen te d, t he
sea rch  would be  valid (bu t n o Sup rem e Cour t ca se h ad  dir ectly
held  su ch a  search wa s va lid ).
In  Frazier v. Cupp ,63 t he  Cour t  s eemed  to shift  it s  r a t iona le
from th e a g ency  ana lysi s used  in  Stoner t o an  assumpt ion-of-
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64. Id . at  740; see also H ALL, supra  note 31, § 8:34, at 432-33.
65. S ee LAF AVE ,  supra  note 34, § 8.3(a), at 718 (qu oting Mich ael E . Tigar ,
Wa iver  of Con st itu tion al R igh ts : Disq ui et in  th e Cita del , 84 HARV. L. RE V. 1, 14
(197 0)).
66. S ee id .
67. 415 U. S. 1 64 (1 974 ).
68. S ee id . at 166S67.
69. S ee supra  text a ccompa nying note 64.
risk ra t iona le.  In  Frazier, t he p olice  obt a in ed  conse n t  from the
defendan t ’s cous in  to sea rch  a  duffel bag that  they jointly used.
The defendan t a rgued  th at  his cousin did n ot ha ve a u t h or i ty to
consent t o a search of the bag because he was au thorized to use
only one pocket  of th e bag. The Cour t ’s r es pon se  br ough t  abou t
a  new  ra tion ale  in t hir d-pa rt y consent  cases : because the
defendan t  allowed  his  cousin  to u se t he  bag,  he “assumed  the
risk th at  [his cousin ] would a llow someone else to look inside”
th e ba g.64
After  Frazier,  many t h ou ght  th at  th e Court  tota lly rejected
the Stoner r a t ion a l e t h a t on ly an  agen t of th e defen da nt  could
give effective th ird-pa r ty consen t .65 For the next several years,
unce r t a in ty existed as to which rat ionale was appropriat e for
t h ird-part y consent cases.66 The  Su pr em e Cour t r esolved  t he
disp ut e in  United S tates v. Matlock ,67 and for  the  fi r st  t ime,  the
Court  art iculated a clear r ule for third-party consent cases.
The defendan t  in  Matlock was a r r e st ed  in  his front yard for
robbin g a federa lly insu red ba nk . At the ar re st , severa l officers
went  t o t h e  fr on t  door  of the  home and asked  the defendan t ’s
gir lfr iend, wh o live d in  the h ome wit h  the d efenda nt , for
per mis sion to sea rch  the  house for t he st olen money. The
girlfriend agreed  an d allowed th e officers t o search t he h ome.
Su bseq ue nt ly, the officers foun d t he s tolen  mon ey an d u sed it
as evidence to convict th e defendant .68
In  addr essing wh eth er t he consen t  by the defendant ’s
girlfriend was  const itu tion ally perm issible, the Court  reiter at ed
the assu mpt ion-of-risk  ra tionale first  sta ted  in Frazier,69 to hold
tha t
when  t h e  p rosecu t ion  seeks  to  jus t i fy  a  war ran t less  sea rch  by
p r oo f of volun ta ry  conse nt , it  is n ot l i m it e d  t o p r o of t h a t
consen t  w a s  g iv e n  b y t h e  d e fe n d a n t ,  bu t  m a y  s h o w t h a t
pe rm iss ion  to  search  w as  ob t a i n e d  fr om  a  t h ir d  p ar t y w h o
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70. Ma tlock , 415 U.S. at 171.
71. Id . at  171  n. 7 (cit at ion s om it te d).
72. S ee supra  notes 46S47 and  accompanying t ext .
73. LAF AVE , supra  note 34, § 8.3(a), at 720.
74. Id .
75. S ee Bu mp er  v. N or th  Ca ro lin a,  391  U. S. 5 43,  548  (196 8).
posses sed co m m on  a u t h o r it y  ov er  or  o the r  su f fi ci en t
re lat ions hip  to t h e p re m ise s or  e ffe ct s  s ou g h t  t o b e  in s p e c t ed .70
At  tha t  poin t , the  Cour t  inse r ted  an  im por t an t  footnote  to
exp la in wha t  it  mean t by the  t erm “common  au thor i ty .”
C om m on  a u t h o r it y  is , o f co u r se, n ot  t o  be  im p l ie d  fr o m  t h e
m e r e p r o p e r t y  i n t e r e s t  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  h a s  i n  t h e  p r o p e r t y .  Th e
a u t h o r i t y w h i ch  j u s t ifi es  t h e  t h ir d -p a r t y  co n s en t  d o es  n o t  r e s t
u p o n  t h e  la w  of p r oper ty ,  wit h it s a tt en da nt  his tor ical a nd
legal  r e fi n e m e n t s, b u t  r e s t s r a t h e r  o n  m u t u a l  u s e  of t h e
p r o pe r t y by per son s gen er ally  h av in g join t a ccess  or con tr ol for
mos t  p u r p os es , s o t h a t  i t  is  rea sona ble to re cognize  th at  an y of
t h e  co-in h a b it a n t s h a s  t h e r ig h t t o per m it t he  ins pect ion in  his
own  rig h t a n d t h at  th e ot h er s h av e a ss u m ed  th e r isk  th at  on e
of the i r  n um ber  m ight  per mi t  t he  comm on a r ea  to  be
s e a r c h e d .71
After  Matlock, th ere  was  litt le doubt  tha t th e Court  rejected
the agency rat ionale and instead opted for  t he  “common
au thor i ty” ru le.  In  add it ion , it  aga in  rejected  the n ot ion  t ha t
t rad it iona l pr opert y law s hou ld pla y a r ole in det erm ining t he
validit y of t h ird -pa r ty consen t .72 Thu s, un der t he m odern r ule,
t h ird -pa r ty consen t is  effective if t he p rose cut ion  can  sh ow tha t
first,  the “conse n t in g par ty cou ld  pe rmit  the s ea rch  ‘in his  own
r igh t ,’”73 second, t he defendant  “‘assumed  the r i sk ’ tha t  a  co-
occupan t migh t p er mit  a s ea rch ,”74 and  third , the cons ent  is
volunta ry.75
4. Ill in ois v . Rod r igu ez: the adoption of the apparent auth ority
stand ard
The Matlock Cou r t  did n ot  cla r ify every uncertainty of third-
pa r ty consent  law. It expres sly left open t he qu estion wh eth er
consen t  by a th ird pa rt y would be valid if th e sea rch ing  offi ce r s
rea sona bly belie ved  the p er son  to h a ve  au thor i ty over  the
premises, regar dless of whether  th e th ird pa r ty had  actua l
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76. S ee Ma tlock , 415 U.S. at 177 n.14.
77. 497 U. S. 1 77 (1 990 ).
78. S ee WILLI AM  E. RI N GE L , SE A R C H E S  & SE I Z U R E S  ARRESTS AND CO N F E S S I ON S
§ 9.5(c)(1), at  9S47 (S ep t.  199 8).
79. S ee R odr igu ez , 497 U.S. at 179S80.
80. S ee id . at 180.
81. S ee id .  a t 181. The Court added that “[o]n these facts the Stat e has n ot
established  tha t . . . [the g irlfrie nd] h ad ‘joint a ccess or cont rol for m ost pu rpos es.’ ”
Id . at 182.
82. S ee id .
83. S ee id . at 188-89.  The R odr igu ez  Cour t  di d n o t  decide whether the officers’
au thor i ty to consen t .76 Tha t issu e was n ot resolved unt il 1990
when  the S up rem e Cour t h an ded d own t he cont rover sia l
Il linois  v.  R odrigu ez77 de cis ion .78
In  R odrigu ez , t he p olice  ga in ed  acce ss  t o the  de fendan t ’s
apar tment  via  the con se n t  and a ss is t ance of a  wom a n  w h o h ad
pr eviously lived w ith  the de fen da nt , bu t  had s in ce m oved  out  of
the apa r tmen t . The woman cla imed  tha t  th e defendan t bea t h er
ea rlier  th at  day, so when officers requ ested  th at  she t ak e th em
to the a pa r tmen t , she con se n ted . Wh ile  dr iving t o the
defendan t ’s apa r tment,  sh e r efe r red  to the p rem ises  as “ou r
ap ar tm en t.” Wh e n  th ey arr ived, she opened th e door with  her
key, allowing the officers to en ter  and sea rch  for  t he  de fendan t .
As th e officers wa lked about t he ap ar tm ent, t hey saw in  p la in
view several stash es of d rug par aph ern alia. Thu s, th ey arr ested
the defen da nt  for poss ess ion of illegal d ru gs.7 9  At  h i s
su ppr ession  hear ing , the  de fendan t  ar gued tha t  the  woman who
gave consen t  d id  not  have common au thor i ty over  the
apa rt men t a nd wa s th us u na ble to give valid consen t. 80
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendan t  tha t  the
woman did not m eet t he Matlock  common au thor i ty t e st  and
thus had  no actua l au thor i ty  to cons en t  t o the  sea rch .81 Bu t ,
s ince the office r s r eli ed  on the woman’s a ss er t ion s t o conclude
she did ha ve comm on au th ority, the Cour t h ad t o determ ine
whet her  the office r s’ reason able  be lie f ju st ifie d t he s ea rch .82
The Cour t  u lt imate ly  adop ted  the appa ren t  au thor i ty standa rd,
holding tha t  if pol ice officers r eas ona bly believe t ha t t he t hir d
pa r ty sh ar es comm on a ut hor ity over  the  proper ty  wi th  the
defendan t , an d t hu s can  give effective conse nt  to a  sea rch , th e
th ird -pa r ty consen t is valid, rega rdless  of whet her  th e
individual actua l ly  shares  common au thor i ty with  the
defendan t .83
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belief in t his  cas e wa s r ea son ab le. B eca us e t he  Cou rt  of Appeals did not address the
i ss u e, the Su preme Cour t rem anded t he case so the lower court could determ ine
wheth er  the officers’ determin ation t hat  the t hird pa rty h ad common a uth ority was
reasona ble. See id.  at 189.
84. Id . at 188 (quoting Ter ry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21S22 (1968) (ellipsis in
or igin al )).
85. S ee id . at 188S89.
86. S ee id . at 185.
87. Id . at  186  (cit at ion s a nd  foot no te s om it te d).
88. S ee, e.g., Thoma s Y. Davies , Den yin g a R igh t by  Dis regar di ng  Doctr in e: How
Illinois  v. Rodrigu ez Demeans Consent,  Trivializes Fourth  Am endm ent Reasonableness,
and Ex agger ates  th e Ex cus abi lit y of P olice E rror , 59 TE N N . L. RE V. 1, 6 (1991)
(argu ing tha t th e Rehnquist  Court ha s interp reted t he rea son ab len es s cla us e of t he
Four th  Amen dme nt  in a  way t ha t dim inish es defen dan ts’ right s); Tamm y Cam pbell,
Note, S hou ld  Ap pa ren t A ut hor ity  Va lid at e T hi rd -Par ty  Con sen t Searches?, 63 U . Colo.
L. Rev. 481  (1992)  (a rgu ing  tha t  t he appa ren t  au thor i ty doc t r ine  canno t p rot ect
The test  a r t iculated by t he Court  to deter mine wh eth er
effective consen t  was given is: “[W]ould th e facts ava ilable to
the officer a t t h e  m om e n t  .  . .  ‘war ran t  a  man  of reasonab le
cau t ion  in th e belief’ tha t  the  consen t ing par ty had  aut h or ity
over th e pr emis es?”8 4 If th e officer a ns wer s t his  que st ion in t he
negat ive, then  a  war ran t less  sea rch  is  un lawfu l  un less the
consen te r had  actua l au thor i ty. On  the  other  hand,  if the
answer is in the affirmat ive, the warra ntless search is valid.85
The bas ic underp inn ing of the Cour t’s a na lysis in  R odrigu ez
is t ha t  t he Four th  Amendmen t ’s rea sonablen ess clause governs
fa ct u a l de te rmina t ions  by police officers, in cludin g
det e r m ina t ions whether  a  th ird  pa r ty has  au thor i ty to consen t
to a search. The Court  held t h a t  r easonab leness  does  not
alw ays  req uir e an  officer’s fact ua l det erm ina tions to be  correct ;
it  only re quir es t ha t h is det erm ina t ion  be rea sonable.86 As a
resul t , the  Cour t  concluded tha t
[t]h e  C o n s t it u t i on  i s  n o m o r e  v io la t e d  w h e n  o ff ice r s  en te r
w it h ou t  a  w a r r an t  b eca u s e t h ey  r eason ably ( th ough
err oneous ly) beli e v e t h a t  t h e  p e r s on  w h o  h a s  co n s en t e d  t o
the i r  en t r y  i s  a  r e s iden t  o f  t he  p rem ises , t ha n  i t  i s  v iol a t ed
when  t h e y  en t e r  w i t h ou t  a  w a r r a n t  b e c a u s e t h ey  re as ona bly
(t h ou g h e r roneous ly )  be li eve  they  a re  in  pu r su i t  o f  a  v iol en t
f e lon  who  i s  abou t  t o  e scape .87
Many commenta tors  cr i t icized the  R odrigu ez  holding,  argu ing
tha t  the S upr em e Cour t ’s in ter pr et a t ion  of the F our th
Amendmen t  in  this way unnecessarily eroded defendant s’
rights.88 Noneth eless, th e doctr ine of apparen t  au thor i ty has
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defendants’ Fou rt h Am end men t r ight s); Nan cy J. Klos ter , Note , An An alysis of t he
Gradual  Erosion of the Fourth A mend ment R egarding Voluntary Th ird-Party  Consen t
S earches: The Defendant’s Perspective, 72 N.D. L. RE V. 99, 122S23 (1 996 ) (“[T]he
United  S t a t es Su prem e Cour t h as m oved furt her  an d furt her  awa y from t he or iginal
purpose of the  Four th  Amendment , which  was  to protect  individual rights.”); Michael
C. Wieber , Comm ent , Th e Theory and Practice of Illinois v. Rodriguez: Why an
Officer’s R easonable Beli ef Ab out  a T hi rd  Par ty’s Au th orit y to C ons ent  Does N ot
Prot ect a Criminal Defendant’s Rights, 84 J.  CRIM . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604  (199 3).
89. S ee, e.g., United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 1997); United
Stat es v. Bra zel, 102 F.3d  1120, 1148 (11th  Cir. 1997); Un ite d Sta tes v.  Jen kins, 92
F.3d 430, 438 (6th Cir. 1996);  Un ite d S ta te s v.  El liot , 50  F. 3d  180 , 18 7 (2d  Cir . 19 95).
90. United  St at es  v. M at lock , 41 5 U .S.  164 , 17 1 n .7 (1 974 ).
91. S ee Uni ted  S ta t es  v . Gambina, No.  96-1732, 1997 WL 383493, at **2 (2d
Cir . J ul y 9, 1 997 ) (“In t he  cas e of t hi rd -pa rt y conse nt , th e issue  is  whethe r  t he
consent ing party possessed a sufficient relationship to the searched premises to
v a li da t e t he  se ar ch. ”); Un it ed  St at es  v. E lliot , 50  F. 3d  180 , 18 5 (2d  Cir . 19 95) (“ The
qu est ion  with respect t o a third-par ty aut horization is wheth er th e t h i rd pa r ty
possessed ‘a  su fficient  rela tion ship  to th e sea rch ed pr emis es t o valida te t he s ear ch.’”)
(quotin g Un it ed  St at es  v. T rz as ka , 85 9 F .2d  111 8, 1 120  (2d C ir . 19 88)).
92. United  St at es  v. M cAlpi ne , 91 9 F .2d  146 1, 1 464  (10t h C ir . 19 90).
quick ly become a  common doct r in e u se d b y fed er a l cou r t s t o
uphold warrant less third-part y consent searches.89
C. Relationships Th at May Give Rise to Effective Third-Party
Con sen t
1. Why relationship m atters
When  a  th i rd pa r ty consen t s  to a  sea rch  of the  de fendan t ’s
pr oper ty, Matlock re qu ire s t ha t t he  consen tin g pa rt y ha ve joint
access or  con t rol over the  proper ty  for  “mos t  purposes,” so tha t
the th ird  pa rt y can cons ent  to t he s ear ch “in his own  righ t .”90
When  cour t s  apply the  Matlock common  au thor i ty  tes t , th ey
neces sa rily emb ar k on a  discuss ion of th e relat ionship bet ween
the consen tin g pa rt y an d t he  defen da nt . Howeve r, t he
re la t ion s h ip bet ween  the d efenda nt  and t he t h ir d p ar ty is  not
the centr al issu e in deciding whet her  th e t h ird  pa r ty had
au thor i ty to consen t  to the  sea rch ; instead,  the r e levan t  inqu iry
is whether  the th ird  pa rt y ha d a  su fficient  rela tion sh ip wit h  the
p roper ty to be sea rched to ju s t ify effective consen t. 91 “[A]s
Matlock ma kes  clear , th e r eleva nt  a na lys is  in  t h ird -pa r ty
consen t  cases focuses  on  the relat ionship bet ween t he consent er
and th e propert y sear ched, not th e relat ionship bet ween t he
consen te r  and  the defendan t .”92
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93. Id .
94. S ee Ka tz v . Un ite d St at es,  389 U .S. 3 47, 3 61 (19 67) (H ar lan , J ., con cu rr ing)
(argu ing tha t for the Four th Amen dment  to apply, the per son  searched must first
ha ve a subjective “expectation of privacy and, second, that  the expectat ion be one tha t
society is prepar ed to recognize as ‘reasona ble’”).
95. S ee Ma tlock ,  415 U .S.  a t  170S71; see also Fra zier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740
(196 9).
96. United  St at es  v. J en ki ns , 92  F. 3d  430 , 43 6 (6t h C ir . 19 96).
At  first blush, this language would suggest th at  the
rela tion sh ip bet ween  th e consen tin g pa rt y an d t he d efend an t is
tota l ly i r re levan t ; however , cou r t s  have  not  gone  that  fa r .
Cour t s r ecognize  tha t  t he re lat ionsh ip bet ween  th e consen tin g
th ird pa r ty a nd t he d efenda nt  is  rele va nt  for  two r easons . F ir s t ,
the relat ionship is releva nt  to th e extent  th a t  it  bea rs  “on  the
nexus between  th e consen ter  and th e pr oper ty.”93 In oth er
words, when ana lyzing whether the th ird party  has  a  su ffi cien t
rela t ion sh ip t o t he pr operty t o be searched, it is a ppr opriat e to
look  at  th e relat ionship bet ween  the  th ird  pa r ty and  the
defendan t . Secon d, court s r out inely a ddr ess t he r elat ionsh ip
between  the consenting third par ty and t he defendant  to
det erm ine w h ether (and to what extent) the defendant  had a
reason a ble expecta tion of privacy in the pr operty th at  was
searched.
The defendant ’s expectation of privacy is relevant for two
reasons. F ir s t , t he  pol ice  cannot  com m i t  a  Four th  Amendment
viola t ion  if the defendant  has  no rea son able  exp ect a t ion  of
pr ivacy in t he  pr oper ty t ha t w as  sea rch ed. F or  exa mple, i f the
de fen da nt  has n o rea son able  exp ect a t ion  of privacy th at  society
is willin g to accept , th en it  is likely  tha t  no Four th  Amendment
viola t ion  has occurred.94 Second, t he p rim ar y ra tion ale
just ifying third-party consen t  searches  is  assumption of r i sk .95
“For  a t hird  par ty to ha ve ‘a u t h or ity ’ over  a  space  he does  not
own, th e owner  mu st  ha ve as su med  th e ris k t ha t t he t hir d
pa r ty would  consen t t o a se ar ch.”96 Thu s, cour ts  ha ve
re cognized th at  th e relat ionship bet ween  th e consen tin g th ird
pa r ty an d th e defendan t dir ectly bea r s  on  the d egr ee  of pr iva cy
the defendan t expected t o maint ain a nd t he degr ee to which  the
defenda n t  assum ed th e risk t ha t t he t hird  par ty would consen t
to a  sea rch .
2. Different ru les for different relationships
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97. F o r a br ief discussion  of differen t r elat ionsh ips inv olved in  th ird -pa r ty
consent  cases and numerous ci tat ions to s ta te  an d fe de ra l cou rt s’ tr ea tm en t of t he
different  relationsh ips, see CH A R LE S E. TORCIA, WHARTON ’S  CRIMINAL P RO C E DURE
§ 173  (13t h e d. 1 997 ).
98. S ee Uni ted S ta tes  v.  Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A third-
par t y consent is also easier to sust ain if the relat ionship between th e part ies—parent
to chi ld h er e, s pou se  to s pou se  in  oth er  cas es —is e sp ecia lly cl ose .”).
99. United  Stat es v . D u r a n, 957 F.2d 499, 504S05 (7t h C ir . 199 2) (cita tion s
om it te d).
100. This  Comm ent  addr esses  a h an dful of  th e  relationsh ips that  are often
litigated in t he  cour ts  an d is  by n o me an s ex ha us tiv e. Cou r ts ha ve addressed
numerous othe r r elat ionsh ips to de ter min e whe th er t he conse nt ing t h i r d  pa r ty
possessed th e r equ isi te  au th ori ty  to con se nt  to t he  se ar ch .  F or  e x a mple, court s ha ve
addressed  wh et he r a  pa re nt  can  cons en t t o th e s ea rch  of a child’s room , see LAF AVE ,
supra  note  34 at  § 8.4(b), wheth er a  child can  consent  to a s ear ch of the fa mily  living
quarters,  see i d . at  § 8.4(c); Mat t McCa ugh ey, Not e, And a C hild  S ha ll L ead  T hem :
The Validity of Child ren’s Consent to Warrant less Searches of the Family H om e, 34
U. LOUISVILLE  J . F AM . L. 747 (1995), wheth er a bailor or bailee can  consent  on beh alf
Because  th e par ties in s ome r e lat ionships h ave a r educed
exp ect a t ion  of privacy, cour ts im pose somewha t different
stan dards  for  dete rmin ing the  va lidit y  of th i rd-par ty consen t
depending on the natu re of the relationship.97 Thus,  the n a t u re
of th e re lat ions h ip dir ectly bea rs  up on t he d ifficult y in pr oving
as su mp tion  of r i sk  and  common  au thor i ty .98 F or  exam ple, t he
Seventh  Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that
it  w ou ld  b e in correct  t o  t rea t  spou ses  .  .  .  the  sa me  as  a ny t wo
ind ividu als  s h a r i n g  li vi n g  qu a r t e r s .  T w o fr ien ds inh abi t in g a
t w o-b e dr oo m apa r tm en t  m igh t  r ea s ona bly ex pect  to m ain ta in
exclusive  acce ss  to t h eir  re sp ect ive b ed room s, w ith ou t
exp licitly  m a k i n g t h i s e xp e ct a t io n  cl ea r  t o  on e  a n o t h e r .  T h e
s am e m igh t  ho ld  for  an  adu l t  ch i ld  l i v ing  a t  home .  These
s i tua t ions ,  a s  a  gen er al  ru le, in volve  pr iva cy ex pe cta tion s
g rea t e r  t h a n  t h os e in h er e n t in  a  m a r r i a ge , m a k i n g i t m o r e
difficu lt  to  de m on st r a te  com m on  a u th or it y. I n  th e con te xt  of a
m o r e in t im a t e  m a r it a l r e la t ion s h ip , t h e  bu r d en  u p on  t h e
governmen t  [ to  p rove comm on  au t hor i ty ]  shou ld  be  li gh te r . 99
Because th e natu re of the relationship is an  impor t an t  factor  i n
dete rmin ing th e valid ity  of th ird -par ty conse nt , th is P ar t will
address, by way of exam ple, som e of the comm on r elat ionsh ips
litigated  in  the federa l  cour t s  to i llust ra te  the d iffe ren t
stan dards  th at  ar e applied dep endin g on the r elat ionsh ip
between  the con se n t in g t h ir d p ar ty a nd t he cr im i n al
defendan t .100
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of th e oth er, see LAF AVE , supra note 34, at § 8.6(a) & (b), whether  a host can consent
t o a s ea rch  of his gu est  an d vice ver sa, see i d . at § 8.5(d) & (e), and whet her  a n
educa t iona l ins tit ut ion  c a n consen t t o a sea rch  of stud ent s’ propert y, see i d . a t  §
8.4 (e).  In addition, courts a re often called upon to grapple with third-par ty con sen t
cases th at  do not fit n eat ly un der a ny one  of the cat egories list ed in t h i s a r t ic le . F or
instan ce, i n  Uni ted  S ta t es  v . McAlp ine, 919 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1990), t he  Ten th
C ir cuit  Court of Appeals had to determine whether a  kidnap victim who was held in
the de fenda n t ’s t ra ile r fo r s eve ra l m on th s h ad  au th or it y t o con se nt  to a  se ar ch o f th e
de fendan t ’s proper ty. Th e court  valida ted t he conse nt , holding t ha t t he  defendant  had
no rea sonabl e expecta tion of priva cy since th e victim coha bita ted t he t ra iler wit h t he
de fendan t an d ha d mu tu al a ccess to t he p roper ty. See id.  at  1465. But see U n i t ed
Stat es v. Joh nson , 22 F.3d 67 4, 686 (6th  Cir. 1994) (holdin g th at  a fo u r t ee n -year -old
k idnap v ic t im  d id  not  have au thor i ty to  consen t  t o s ea rch  o f apa r tment ).
101. Duran , 957 F .2d a t 5 03; see also Coolidge v. New Ham pshire , 403 U.S. 443,
489S90 (197 1) (hold ing  th at  one  spou se m ay g ive e ffecti ve con sen t t o th e com mon
areas of house); Unit ed Sta tes v. Bett s, 16 F.3d 748, 755S56 (7th Cir. 1994); 68 AM .
J U R . 2D  Searches and S eizures § 100  (199 3).
102. S ee Duran , 957 F.2d  at  505. Some cour ts, h owever, h ave h ad a  difficult tim e
va lida t ing a consent  sear ch whe n  t h e consenting spouse was n ot on amicable term s
with  th e oth er s pous e. S ee J O S E P H G. CO OK , CONSTITUTIONAL RI G H TS  O F  T H E  AC C U SE D
§ 4:56, at 4-206 to 4-207 (3d ed. 1996); H ALL, supra  note 31, § 8:38, at 437S38;
LAF AVE , supra  note 34, § 8.3(b), at 720S23.
103. Duran , 957 F.2d at  505.
104. Id . at  504 (“[W]e leave open  th e possibilit y th at  one  spou se m ay m ain ta in
exclusive  cont rol ov er  cer ta in p ort ions  of th e fa mi ly h ome st ea d.”); LAF AVE , supra no t e
34, § 8.4(a), at 762.
105. S ee Duran ,  957  F .2d  a t  505  (“One  can  ha ve a ccess  to a  bu ildin g or a  room
but choos e n ot t o en te r.”); LAF AVE , supra  note 34, § 8.4(a), at 762.
a. Marital relationship . When  two spouses live together,
cour t s have p res umed  tha t  “one sp ouse  has t he a u thor ity t o
consen t  to a  se a rch  of [the] p rem ises  join t ly occu pied  by both
spou ses .”101 As noted above, prosecutors have an easier burden
in  p rov ing  common au thor i ty when  t he re i s a  mar i t a l
re la t ionsh ip th an  in oth er t ypes of rela tion sh ips  because of the
redu ced expect at ion of priva cy and increased  assumpt ion  of
r isk .102
However , the  same cour t s  t ha t  r ecognize the  spousa l
p resumpt ion , als o recognize t ha t it  is a  reb ut ta ble p resumpt ion .
“[T]he  nonconsent ing sp ouse m ay r ebu t t his  pr esu mp tion  only
by showing tha t  the  consen t ing sp ouse  wa s d en ied  acces s t o the
par t icu la r ar ea  sea rch ed.”103 To r ebut  the p res umpt ion , cou r t s
gener ally req uir e “someth ing m ore sp ecific” such  as  p roof tha t
the “consen t ing spouse wa s denied a ccess” to the pr operty
searched.104 If  a  spouse  has a cces s t o pr ope r ty, bu t  choose s n ot
to use th e prope r ty, s he s t ill  has a u thor it y t o conse n t  to the
search .105
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106. S ee Duran , 957 F.2d at 505.
107. S ee LAF AVE , supra  not e 34 , § 8.4(a ), at  762; see also H ALL, supra  note 31 ,
§ 8:44, at 445S46; R I N G E L, supra  note 78, § 9.5(d), at 9-54.1.
108. S ee Stoner  v. California , 376 U.S. 483, 489S90 (1964) (invalidating consent
by hote l clerk t o sear ch room of gues t); Cha pma n v.  Un it ed Sta tes, 364 U.S. 610,
616S18 (1961) (invalidat ing consen t by owne r/lessor  to sea rch t ena nt ’s leased
pr em ise s); 68 AM . J U R . 2D  Searches and S eizures § 95 (1 993 ).
109. S ee supra  Par t II.B.1.
110. S ton er, 376 U.S. at 490.
111. United  St at es  v. M at lock , 41 5 U .S.  164 , 17 1 n .7 (1 974 ).
Thus, in Duran , the cour t  upheld a  sea rch  when  the  wi fe
cons en t ed to a  sea rch  of the  ba rn  which  her  husband
exclusively used  a s  a  gym. The cour t  de em ed  ir rele va nt  the fa ct
tha t  she had  no persona l  effect s  in  the  ba rn  and  never  used  the
bu ildin g. Because t he  wife could ha ve accessed the  bu i ld ing  any
t ime she wished, but  ins te ad  chose n ot t o, th er e wa s en ough  to
establish th e requ isite au th ority to consen t. 106 Accor d ing to
Professor  LaFave , th i s r eason ing suggest s  tha t  the on ly rea l
way to prevent  one spouse from g iv ing e ffect ive  consen t  t o a
sea rch  of th e other ’s p roper ty i s for  t he  proper ty to be under  the
exclus ive cont rol of t h e nonconsen t ing spouse and  for  the
nonconsen t ing spouse  to complet ely  de ny a cces s t o the
consen ting sp ouse.107
b .  L a n d l o r d - t e n a n t / i n n k e e p e r - g u e s t  re l a t ion -
ship . Gener a lly , t he owner  of leased property has no au thor i ty
to g ive e ffect ive  consen t  t o s ea rch  h is  t enan t ’s  p roper ty.108 As
d is cu ssed in Part  II.B.1, the Suprem e Court ’s early third-party
consen t  case s involve d a  la ndlord con se n t in g t o a  sea rch  of his
t enan t’s pr oper ty. Th ese ca ses  illus tr at e t ha t e ven  th ough  a
la ndlord may  have a legal right  to ent er t he leas ed prem ises (to
view wast e, for  example ),  tha t  r igh t  does  not  g ran t  him the
au thor i ty to consent to a search of the premises;109 otherwise,
the pr iva cy in ter es t  of any lessee  wou ld  be  su bject  to the
“unfe t t er ed discretion” of the landlord.110 The Supreme Cour t
has als o repe at edly a ffir med  tha t  th ir d-p ar ty con se n t  is  not
based  on  aspect s  of p roper ty  law “with  i t s a t t endan t  h i stor ica l
an d lega l re finem en ts .”111
Cou r t s do recognize some limit ed exceptions to th e genera l
ru le t ha t  a  land lord h a s  n o a u thor i ty to consen t  to a  sea rch  of
the leased premises. For instan ce, if the landlord shar es mutu al
use an d access to th e pr op er ty wit h t he  defen da nt , he m ay give
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112. S ee Un it ed  St at es  v. J en ki ns , 92  F. 3d  430 , 43 7 (6t h C ir . 19 96) (“[I]f t he
l andlord ass ert s th at  he st ores pr opert y or occasionally  lives with th e tena nt, th en
a  rea sona ble officer m ay be ju stified in  ass um ing t ha t t h e  co n sen te r h as  comm on
au thorit y.”) (cit in g ca se s); U ni te d S ta te s v.  El liot , 50  F. 3d  180 , 18 6 (2d  Cir . 19 95) (“[I]f
the landlord has  joint a ccess or control over certain ar eas of his apart ment  buildin g
for  most purposes, he may validly con se nt  to a  se ar ch o f th ose  ar ea s.”) (cit in g ca se s);
United  Sta tes  v. Cha idez, 919 F .2d 1193, 1 201 (7th  Cir. 1990) (“Use of and access to
the pr oper ty a re  th e t ouch st one s of a ut hor ity .”); LAF AVE , supra  not e 34, § 8.5(a), at
777 (“Th e le ss or’s con se nt  ma y be  effect ive,  how eve r,  wh en  it  is g iven  wit h r es pect
to a portion of the prem i se s  wh ich i s n ot t he n i n t he  excl us ive  pos se ss ion  of th e
les se e.”).
113. S ee Un it ed  St at es  v. K ell er ma n,  431  F. 2d  319 , 32 4 (2d  Cir . 19 70).
114. S ee LAF AVE , supra  note 34, § 8.5(a), at 780.
115. United  Stat es v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1148 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Abel
v. Un it ed  St at es , 36 2 U .S.  217 , 24 1 (19 60)).
116. S ee Ch aid ez , 919 F.2d at 1201.
117. S ee U n i t e d S t a tes v . Kim , 105  F.3 d 15 79, 1 582 (9 th  Cir . 199 7); Ch aid ez , 919
F.2d at 1202.
118. S ee supra  n otes 98S99 a nd  accom pa ny ing  te xt; see also LAF AVE , supra  no t e
34, § 8.5(c), at 789 (“In at tempt ing to identify the area s or zones of exclusive use in
a  joint occupancy situat ion, it is useful at the out set to deter mine t he  cha ra cte r or
na tu re of the joint occupan cy, for this ma y reveal much a bout the jus tified
expecta t ions of th e occu pa nt s.”).
effective th ird-par ty consen t  to a  sea rch .112 Thus,  a l and lord
may give effective consen t over comm on ar eas sh ar ed by a ll
tenan ts, such  as  ha llways or  a  common basement .113 Another
sit ua tion  in which court s have recognized a landlord’s r igh t  t o
consen t  to a sea rch is wh en t he le a sed prem ises ha ve been
vaca ted or abandoned.114 In tha t situat ion, courts have held
tha t  “a  t enan t  who abandons  the p roper ty loses  any r easona ble
expect at ion of priva cy he once h ad .”115
Cour t s ar e als o more w illing to allow third-pa rt y consen t
when  the lessee sub-leases th e  pr opert y to an oth er in dividu al,
a s long as th e less ee  main ta in s con t rol over  and a cces s t o the
pr oper ty.  In  normal t en an t /su b-t en ant  rela t ion sh ips,  cour t s
follow  the  genera l l andlord /t enan t  ru le  and hold tha t  the  t enan t
cannot  consen t  t o a  s ea rch  of t he  sub -t enan t’s  p roper ty.116
However , i f the  t enan t  has a right to access th e pr opert y at  will,
and the  sub-tenan t ’s  act ions  show a  de crea se d e xpect a t ion  of
pr ivacy su ch t ha t h e as su med  th e ris k  t h a t  th e te na nt  could
consen t t o a sea rch , th e sea rch  will be h eld va lid.117
c. Cotenant or room m ate relationship . Relationships
involving roommates  or  coten ant s gen er a lly  rece ive  more
pr otection  th a n  th ose involving in tim at e re lat ionsh ips lik e
hu sba nd -wife or parent-child.118 The ra t iona le for requ irin g
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119. S ee Unit ed Sta tes v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Th ird  pa r ty
consents  to s ea rch  th e pr oper ty of a not he r a re  ba sed  on a  re du ced e xpe cta tion  of
pr iva cy in  the  premises  or  th ings  shared with  ano ther .  When  an  apa r t m e n t, for
example, i s sha red,  one  ord inarily a ssumes  the r isk tha t a co-tenant  might consent
to a  se a r ch . . . .”); Unite d Sta tes v. Morn ing, 64 F.3d 531, 536 (9th  Cir. 1995) (“We
agree  that t he primary factor is the defendant ’s reasona ble expectat ions under t he
circumsta nces. Those expectations mu st include the risk th at a co-occupa nt  will all ow
som eon e to e nt er , ev en  if t he  de fen da nt  doe s n ot a pp ro ve of t he  en tr y.”).
120. United  Stat es v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974); see also DA RI E N A.
MCWH I R TE R , SEARCH , SEIZURE , AND P RIVACY 10 (1 994 ).
121. S ee Morn ing, 64 F.3d at 536; Lenz v. Winbur n, 51 F.3d 1540, 1548 (11th
Cir . 1995); United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992); United Stat es v.
Hen drix,  595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United Sta t e s v . S u m lin, 567 F.2d 684,
687S88 (6th  Cir. 19 77). But see United Sta tes v. Impink , 728  F .2d  1228 , 1234 (9th
Cir . 1984) (stat ing t ha t t he conse nt ing pa rt y’s “aut horit y to consen t in  he r  o wn  r igh t
‘does not go so far  as t o outweigh  an  equa l claim t o privacy by a co-occupan t  on  the
scene’”).
122. S ee LAF AVE , supra  note 34, § 8.5(c), at 790S91 (ci ti ng  cas es ).
123. 959 F. 2d  861  (10t h C ir . 19 92).
more eviden ce to pr ove comm on a ut hor ity over  th e pr opert y in
roommate si tua t ion s i s t he in crea se d e xpect a t ion  of pr iva cy
sha red  by the  cotenan ts .119 Ther efore,  a s  a  genera l  ru le , one
cotenan t ma y give valid consen t  to sea rch  the  proper ty  of the
other te na nt  only if th e consen tin g pa rt y h a s  a  right to access
t he propert y “in his own r ight” and t he oth er t ena nt  a s s um ed
the risk tha t  h is  roommate would consen t  to the  sea rch .120 Even
if th e nonconsent ing roomma te is pres en t  and ob ject s  to the
search , mos t  cour t s w il l hold tha t  t he othe r  roommate ma y give
valid  consen t  to a  se a r ch  of th e defen da nt ’s p rope r ty if t he
requisite right t o access exists.121
S om e third-party consent cases involving cotenants a r e
rela tively  ea sy  to decide  beca use  they involve  searches  of ar e as
n or m ally thought  of as  common a reas such  as  shared
b a t h r ooms, kitchens, living rooms, hallways, yards, and so
for th .122 Cour ts  ha ve a m ore difficult t ime when  th e consen t
involves the  more  pr iva t e ar ea s a nd  conta ine rs  posse sse d by t he
nonconsen t ing roommate . For  instance , in  United States v.
S a l inas-Cano,123 th e Tent h Circuit  Court  of Appeals held  t h at
a l though one  roommate  had  the au thor i ty  to g ive valid consen t
to sea rch  th e defendan t’s living quar ter s, she did n ot ha ve the
au thor ity  t o consent  to a  search of h is  closed but  unlocked
suit case. Thu s, th e cour t concluded th at  “[a] homeowner’s
consen t  to a sea rch of the h ome ma y not be effective consent  to
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124. Id . a t  863 (quot ing  United  Sta tes  v.  Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725S26 (1984)
(O’Conn or,  J., concu rr ing)).
125. Morn ing, 64 F.3d at  536.
126. S ee generally H ALL, supra  note 31, § 8:50, at 453S54.
127. S ee generally LAF AVE , supra  no te  34,  § 8.6 (c).
128. S ee Un ited S ta tes v. J enk ins, 46 F .3d 447, 456 (5th  Cir. 1995) (holdin g th at
the sea rch  au thor i zed  by  the emp loyee was rea sonable because th e employer
pers onally  “pu t  t he  p re m ises  un der  th e im me dia te  an d com ple te  cont rol of ” his
employee) (qu oti ng  Un it ed  St at es  v. M ur ph y, 5 06 F .2d  529 , 53 0 (9t h C ir . 19 74)).
129. S ee id . at 459 (“[G]iven the exten t of [th e em ploye e’s] domi nion  an d con tr ol
over the videotapes, [the defendants] clearly assume d  t h e  r isk  tha t  [t he  consen t ing
employee] would view them, and t herefore h a d  a  dim in ish ed e xpe cta ti on of p ri va cy
in  thei r  contents . [W]hen [th e defend an ts] as sum ed th e risk  . . . the y also ne cessar ily
assum ed th e risk  th at  [the e mployee ] wou ld allow someone else to view the
videota pes.”) (foot no te s om it te d).
130. S ee id . at  456  (va lida ti ng  an  em ploy ee’s con se nt  beca use the  employee  had
“unlimited access to the videotapes, absolute dominion and contr ol over th e videotapes
and no  dir ect  su pe rv isi on , or  in de ed  an y fel low e mp loye es  in  th e ge ogr ap hi c vici ni ty ”);
United  Sta tes v. J enk ins, 92 F .3d 430, 437 (6th  Cir. 1996) (valid a t i n g the consen t by
an  employee truck driver becau se he was r outinely allowed to enter t h e  t r a il er  on
a  sea rch  of a closed object in side  th e hom e.”124 What  th ese cases
illus t r a t e is th at  if a defendan t wa nt s sole aut hority t o consent
to a  s ea rch ,  he s hou ld “live[] alone, or a t lea st  [ha ve] a sp ecial
an d pr ivat e sp ace wit hin  th e joint  re side nce.”125
d . Em ployer-em pl oyee relat ionship . T h e employer-
employee rela t ion sh ip  can  ar ise in  two d iffe r en t  s itua t ions
re leva nt  to th ird-par ty consent  law. The first  ar ises when  an
employee at tem pts  to consen t t o a sear ch th at  will be used
against  th e employer. The second is th e opposite s it u a t ion  tha t
ar ises when  an  employer a t t e m pt s to consen t t o a sear ch to be
used a gainst  th e employee.
(1) Em ployee consents to a search of em ployer’s
property.126 Cour t s  t end  to be r e luct an t  t o apply the  thi rd-pa r ty
consen t  doct r in e when  it  comes  to an  em ployee consen t ing to a
sea rch  of pr operty owned by his em ployer.127 Al though  the
Matlock test  is r eleva nt  in det erm ining whet her  th e employee’s
consen t  is va lid , cou r t s are not completely satisfied that  the test
fully deter mines  th e issue.  As a  resu l t , cour t s  have  used severa l
factors to deter mine wh eth er t he em ployee h a d au thor i ty  to
consen t  to a sea rch of his employer’s proper t y, inclu din g th e
amount  of cont rol t he emp loyee exer cised over  th e pr oper ty, 128
the degr ee t o which t he e mp loyer assumed  the  r isk  tha t  the
employee would  let  oth er s se ar ch t he  pr oper ty, 129 th e level of
access th e em ployee en joys over t he  pr oper ty, 1 30 and  the g ran t
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ C O O K -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
406 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
severa l occa sio ns  an d for  va ri ou s r ea son s).
131. S ee Jenk ins, 92  F. 3d  at  437  (fin din g t ha t t he  dr ive r o f a rig h ad  au thor i ty
to consent to a search used against his employer because  “[t]he ge ner ic relat ionsh ip
between  the owner of a rig and  its driver is char acterized by a considera ble g ra nt  of
au t h or i ty to th e drive r”). Professor L aF ave a dds a ddition al factor s to t hose list ed in
th is ar ti cle,  in clu din g t he  ty pe  of respons ibili tie s t he  em ploye e h as  in r ela tion  to t he
p rope r ty being searched, the status of the employee, the n atu re of the item s to be
searched, an d so fort h. S ee LAF AVE , supra  note 34, § 8.6(c), at 814S16 (cit in g ca ses).
132. S ee generally H ALL, supra  note 31, § 8:49, at 451S52.
133. S ee J O E L SA MA H A, CRIMINAL P R O C E DU RE  340  (2d ed. 19 93) (citing, e.g.,
G il la rd v. S chm idt , 57 9 F .2d  825  (3d C ir . 19 78)).
134. Pr ofess or  LaF ave  notes  oth er  con sid er at ion s cou rt s a dd re ss , in clu din g “(i) t he
exten t to which the par ticular area searched may be sa i d t o ha ve be en  set  as ide  for
the per son al  us e of t he  em ploy ee; a nd  (ii) t he  ext en t t o wh ich  th e s ea rch  wa s
prompted  by a unique or special need of the employer to  m a i n t a in  c lose s cru tin y of
emp loyees.” LAF AVE , supra  note 34, § 8.6(d), at 818.
135. S ee Unit ed Sta tes v. Gar giso, 456 F.2d 584, 586S87 (2 d Ci r.  197 2).
136. S ee Un it ed  St at es  v. B lok , 18 8 F .2d  101 9, 1 021  (D.C . Ci r.  195 1).
of au thor i ty  th e employer places up on th e employee.131
Alt hough non e of th ese fa ctors  is dis posit ive in va lida tin g an
employee’s volunta ry consen t  t o s ea rch  his  em ployer ’s pr oper ty,
if, under  t he t ot a l ity  of the  ci rcumstances , i t  appears  tha t  the
employer assu med t he r isk t ha t h is employee would consent  to
a search, the search will be valid.
(2) Em ployer consents  to a  sea rch  of em pl oyee’s
property.132 Cour ts  em ploy t he Matlock t e st  when  employer s
att empt  to consen t  to a  sea rch  of the employee’s property. Thus,
employers  a re ge ner a lly b ar red  from  giving effective consen t t o
a  sea rch  of a n  e m ployee’s property when that employee has a
rea sona ble exp ect a t ion  of priva cy.133 I f the  employer  has
com m on au thor it y over  the p rope r ty t o be  se arched  su ch  tha t
the employee’s rea sonable pr ivacy int eres t  i s not  v iola ted , the
employer’s volun ta ry consent  will be held va lid.134 Thus,  an
employer could give effective cons en t t o a se ar ch of a st ora ge
ar ea  wher e an  employee h i d s t olen goods becaus e th e employer
had joint a ccess  t o the  a rea  and  had  the  r igh t  to occupy the
area .135 On  the othe r  hand , an  employer’s  consen t  to sea rch  the
p r ivat e desk of his employee, even t hough t he emp loyer owned
the desk, was held invalid because  th e emp loyee ha d exclu sive
r ight  to  use  the  desk.136
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137. S ee infra  Pa rt  III.A.
138. S ee infra  note 167.
III. TH I R D -PART Y CO N S E N T  LAW IN UTAH
 The U t a h  S u pr e m e C ou r t  h a s  n ot  had  vas t  exposu re to
th ird -pa r ty consen t cases. Th e few cases  consi dered by the
supreme cour t involved relat ively simple issu es and
s t r a ight forward applicat ion of th e ru les set forth  by the U nited
Sta tes  Supreme Cour t .137 This  Par t  addresses  how the Utah
Supreme Cour t h as  ap plied fede ra l third-pa r ty consen t  law  to
the cases  tha t have com e be fore  it . It  illu st ra tes  tha t  ea ch of th e
cases decided b y th e Ut ah  Cour t wa s r esolved exclus ively un der
the Four th Amendmen t  wi thou t  r e fe rence  to Ar t icl e I , Sect ion
14 of th e Uta h Constit ut ion. This Part  also addres ses how th e
Utah Court  ha s tr eat ed th e textu al simila rity bet ween  t h e two
cons t itu t iona l provisions and  an alyzes th e inst an ces in wh ich
the Ut ah  Cour t h as  explicitly de cided  to de pa r t  from the
re spe ctive federal sta nda rd  to g ive Utah  de fendan t s  more
pr otection  t h an  p rov ided  under  the  Four th  Amendment .
Fin ally,  th is Pa rt  examin es how Ut ah  appel l a te cour t s  have
invited  local at tor neys to brief and a rgue wh eth er a ny
dist inct ion shou ld be d rawn between  the Utah Cons t itu t ion  and
the Un ited  St at es Cons tit ut ion with  r e spect  t o t h ird -pa r ty
consen t  l aw.
A. Application of Federal Third-Party Consent Law in Utah
 Al though  Utah  cour t s  a r e fr ee to pa r t from the  federa l third-
pa r ty consen t  s t anda rd  and p rov ide defendan t s  wi th more
protect ions th an  th ose a fforded  by  the  Un i ted S ta t es
Con st it u t ion ,138 Ut ah  cour t s h ave r eli ed  exclusively on  the
Four th Amendment  ana lys is  ou t l ined in  Matlock to decide the
th ird -pa r ty cases th at  ha ve come before th em. T h e Utah
Supreme C ou r t  has ha d three substa ntial occasions to discuss
th ird -pa r ty consen t. Th ese ca ses w ill be discussed below to
illustr at e how th e Uta h Su prem e Court  ha s app lied federal
third-party consent st andar ds.
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ C O O K -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
408 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
139. 432 P. 2d  64 (U ta h 1 967 ).
140. S ee i d . at 65.
141. S ee id .
142. S ee i d .
143. Id . at 66.
144. Id . at 69.
145. 748 P. 2d  106 9 (U ta h 1 987 ).
1. Sta te v . Kent 139
 Alth ough  de cided  before Matlock, th is cas e is sim ilar  t o
Stoner because  it  in volve d t he ques t ion  of whet her  a h otel
opera tor  cou ld gi ve e ffect ive  cons en t  to search the r oom of a
guest. Officers from th e Sa lt La ke City Police Depart men t
sus pected Mr . Ken t a nd  his  wife of possess ing a nd  us ing illega l
d rugs wh ile  livin g in  a  loca l h otel.  Th e office r s ob tained the
consen t  of the  hote l manager t o spy on  the  de fendan t  and  h is
wife  from a hidden poin t  in  the a t t i c.  By  peer ing th rough  a
ven t ila tor  in th e ceiling, the officers observed th e couple over a
two-d a y per iod and witnessed them u sing illegal drugs. As a
re su l t, offi ce r s  en tered the  hote l room withou t  a  warr an t  and
ar rest ed th e couple. 140
The defendan t , Mr . Kent ,  a rgued tha t  the evidence obta ined
should ha ve been sup pres sed un der t he F ourt h Amen dmen t
because it u nla wfully in vad ed h is pr ivacy.141 In  response,  the
s t a t e a rgued tha t  because the re was  no ph ysical in vas ion by t he
police, the evidence should not be suppres sed .142 The Utah
Supreme Cour t, cit ing S toner and Chapman ,  held tha t  “the
consen t  of a lan dlord or hotel or m otel man ager wou ld not be
suffi cien t  t o ju s t ify  an  offi ce r  t o make a  sea rch  of t he  t enan t ’s
prem ises withou t  a  warran t .”143 The cour t  ju st ified its  holdin g
on the  bas is  tha t  when  the defendan t  and  h is  wife  ren ted the
hotel room, t he y “obta ine d exclu sive r ight  to use it, wh ich
included the  r ight  t o priva cy.”144 Ther efore t he h otel man ager
had  no au thor i ty to consen t  to the  sea rch .
2. Stat e v. Johnson 145
 The next  ma jor  case a rose under  a completely different  set
of ci rcumstances . In  Johnson ,  a  parole offi cer  condu cted  a
warra ntless sea rch  of the  home which  the defendan t occupied
with  h is  mother.  Th e d efenda nt  had given  wr it t en  conse n t  to a
warra ntless sea rch  as  a  cond it ion  of h i s pa role agreement ;
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ C O O K -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
381] THIRD -PARTY CONSE NT TO SE ARCH 409
146. S ee id . at 1071.
147. S ee id . at 1073.
148. S ee id .
149. Id . (qu oti ng  Un it ed  St at es  v. M at lock , 41 5 U .S.  164 , 17 1 (19 74)).
150. S ee id . at 1074.
151. 853 P. 2d  851  (Ut ah  199 2).
152. S ee id . at 854S56.
however, when the officer began to search, the defendant ’s
moth er  apparent ly objected. The Utah Supr eme Cour t wa s th en
faced with t he qu estion wh eth e r  t h e officer violated t he
defendan t ’s or  h is  mother’s Four th  Amendm ent  right  to be free
from unreasonab le  sea rches.146
The defendan t  a rgued tha t  al t h ou gh  h i s pa role agreement
a llow ed  for  war ran t less sea rches, th e sea rch  was  st ill
uncons t itu t iona l becau se it  inva ded  th e r ight  of privacy held by
h is mother. The court disposed of t h i s a rgument ,  st a t ing tha t
those wh o choose to live wit h a  pa rolee h ave  a r educed
exp ect a t ion  of privacy due to the consent t o search grant ed by
the par olee.147 However ,  when  a pa rolee lives with  other
tenan ts, officer s a re limit ed  by t he cot en ancy a s t o the a reas
th ey a re  a llowed  to sea rch .148 Thus, “[t]he scope of consent
imp liedly give n  by a  cote nant  is  lim it ed  to those  pa r t s of t he
prem ises where the tena nts possess ‘common  au thor i ty  over  or
other su fficie n t  rela t ion sh ip  to the p remises  or  e ffect s  sought  to
be ins pect ed.’”1 4 9  As a  res u lt , t he cou r t  uph eld  the s ea rch
because  the office r s l im it ed  their  se a rch  to the com mon a reas
(such  as t he h allway) an d did not d istu rb a ny ar ea u nder  th e
exclusive con t rol  of t he  de fendan t ’s  mothe r .150 Thus,  there  was
no Four th  Amendment  v iola t ion .
3. Sta te v. Brown151
 In  the latest t hird-party consen t  ca s e t o com e  be for e the
Utah Su pr em e Cou r t , pol ice officer s w er e ca lle d t o an
employer’s pla ce of busin ess t o investigate a n a ssa ult. Th e
company owned  sever al t ra i lers wh ich  it  u sed  to house i t s
employees. One of the  t r a il er s  h ad a dual use—it was used to
s tore food and t wo-way radios for th e employees and was also
used  as  the defendan t ’s  res idence. After th e defendant  was
ta ken  to ja il,  pol ice officer s ob ta in ed  conse n t  from the employer
to sear ch th e tr ailer for evidence. The evidence  ga the red  from
the search was used to convict th e defendant .152
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153. S ee id . Th e cour t spe cifica lly l im it ed  it s h oldi ng  to t he  re qu ir em en ts  of th e
United  S ta t e s Cons t it u t ion. The defendant a ttempted to have the court address
wheth er  the  Utah Con st itu tion  pr ovide d m ore  pr ote ction  th an  th e F our th  Amendmen t ,
bu t t he  cour t  re fused to  addres s  t he issu e becau se th e defend an t did n ot pr operly
raise th e issu e on a ppea l. See id.  at 854 n .1.
154. S ee id . at 855S56.
155. S ee i d . at 856 (noting as import ant  tha t th e only areas sea rched were
comm on areas an d that n othing in the “sole possession o f the d efenda nt  such  as in
a  dr aw er , sl ee pin g ba g, con ta in er , or  foot lock er ” was  se ar che d).
156. S ee id .
157. S ee id . at  854  n. 1 (“[W]e  will not en gage in  a st at e constit ut ional a na lysis
unless an  a rgumen t  fo r  di ff eren t  ana lys is  under  t he  s t at e  and federa l  const i t u t ions
is br iefe d.”) (qu oti ng  St at e v.  La ffer ty , 74 9 P .2d  123 9, 1 247  n. 5 (U ta h 1 988 )).
The Uta h Su prem e Court  addr essed t he qu estion wh eth er
the consen t by th e employer was  valid again st t he em ployee
un der  the  Four th  Amendmen t .153 Applyin g th e Matlock common
au thor i ty tes t , t he cou r t  uph eld  the con se n t  se a rch  becau s e t he
employer had  au thor i ty  to g ive effective consent  t o t he  common
area  of the t r a ile r  tha t  wa s s ea rched . Sin ce a ny em ployee  (or
the owner ) cou ld en ter  t he  tr a il er  a t  any t im e  to access the
refr ige ra tor  or company radios , t h e owner  had  au thor i ty  to
consen t  to a  sea rch  of tha t  common a rea .154 However , t he  Cour t
seemed  to r ecognize t hat  th e owne r could  not  give effective
consen t  t o a ll  pa r t s  of t he  t ra i le r  in quest ion ; he  had  au thor i ty
to consen t  on ly to the  com m on a rea s en joyed by all
employees.155 S ince  the offi ce r s sear ched on ly the  common a reas
and did not invade the defendant ’s p r iva te a rea , the sea rch  was
up held  as  const itu tion al. 156
4. S u m m ary
 Each  of the th ree cases discus sed  above  expr essly  followed
the federal third-party consent st andar d under  t he  Four th
Amendment  as interpret ed by the United Sta tes Supreme
Cour t . Non e of t he U tah  case s r es olved t he t h ir d-p ar ty consen t
i ssue by r es or t in g t o Art icle  I, S ect ion  14  of the  Utah
Con st it u t ion . The on ly case tha t  men tion ed t he a pplica ble
pr ovision of the Uta h Constitution was Brown, w h ere  the
defendan t  made  a  pa ss in g r efe ren ce t o the Ut ah  Const itu tion  in
his brief. However, the Uta h Suprem e Court  refused to address
the defendan t ’s  s t a te const i tu t iona l  a rgument  because the
defendan t  failed  to ana lyze t he is su e a nd t he s t a te d id  not
respond to the  a rgumen t .157 Because t he  Utah  Supreme Cour t
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158. S ee infra  Par t III.B.3.
159. S ee infra  Par t III.C.
160. S ee supra  note 16.
161. The au th or re cognize s  t h at th e Fourt h Amendm ent t o the Unit ed Stat es
Con st itu tion  us es t he  plu ra l form  of “pers ons  or t hin gs t o be se ized” while  the Utah
Con st itu tion  uses th e singular form “person or thin g to be seized .” Beca us e t he  root
words are t he sam e and m erely take on a  differen t  form,  the au thor  cons ide r s t he
two phr ases  to be iden tical.  See supra  note 16.
162. F o r an ex ample of the differences in pun ctuation, see supra not e 16. S ee
also St at e v.  J ack son , 93 7 P .2d  545 , 54 8 n .2 (U ta h C t.  App. 1 997 ) (no t ing  tha t  t he
Utah  se ar ch a nd  se izu re  con st it ut ion al  pr ovis ion  an d t he  “Fou rt h Am en dm en t d iffer []
only in  pu nct ua ti on  an d gr am ma r”).  The a ut hor r ecognizes th at  differences  in
pun ctua tion  a re  n ot  i r rele van t. P un ctu at ion ca n h ave  an  im pa ct on  th e de cision
has discu ss ed  th ir d-p ar ty con se nt  only while  app lying F our th
Amendmen t  sta nda rds , the a forem ent ioned cases ha ve no
bear ing on  the  pr otect ions  a fforded  by  the  Utah  Cons t it u t ion
other th an  to suggest wh at  biases t he Ut ah  Supr eme Cou r t  may
have toward the federal third-party consent st andar ds.
B. Is  T here a  S ubs ta n ti ve D if ference Betw een th e Un it ed
S tates and  Utah  Constitutions?
 Even  t h ou g h  t h e Uta h Su prem e Court  ha s never  decided
whet her  the  Utah Const itut ion mirr ors th e Unit ed Sta tes
Con st it u t ion  with  res pect t o th ird -par ty conse nt  law , the  Utah
Supreme Cour t  has e xpres se d a  wil lin gn es s t o de pa r t  from
federal  cour t s ’ in terp re tat ion  of other  subst a n t ive Four th
Amendment  areas. 158 In  ad dit ion, Ut ah  ap pella te  court s h ave
expressed  a desire to decide whet her  ther e is  any differ en ce
between  stat e and fe de r a l th ird-part y consent la w.159 S ince
Utah court s have expres se d a  wil lin gn es s a nd inclin a t ion  to
depa r t from federal Fourth Amendment  law, there is a
rea sona ble chance  tha t  t h e Utah  Supreme Cour t  would do the
same wit h  res pe ct  to t h ir d-par ty conse nt  doctr ine, es pecially
th e appa ren t a ut hority doctrin e.
1. Textual similarity between the Fourth Am endm ent and
Utah  Cons ti tu t ion: S t a t e v . Wat t s
 On its face, Art icle I, Section 14 of the Ut ah  C on s t it u t ion  is
nea rly  iden tica l  t o t he  Four th  Amendmen t .160 The Utah
Con st it u t ion  uses identical words 161 in th e exact sa me order  as
the Four th  Amen dm ent . The on ly rea l dist inct ion  be tween  the
prov is ions is th eir different u se of punctua t ion .162 Because  of
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wheth er  the  reasonableness c lause s ho ul d b e con st ru ed  as  in de pe nd en t of t he
war ran t s clause or whether, due to the way the sent ences are cr a ft ed , t he
reasonableness clause  is an  int egra l p a r t  of the  war ra nt s clau se. S ee SALTZBURG &
CAPRA, supra  not e 3, a t 3 3 (“[T]he [F our th] Am endment h as two parts, the first
dea ling with un reasona ble searches an d the s econ d dealing with warr ants. Because
the te rm  ‘un re as ona ble’ is u sed  firs t, i t m igh t b e t hou gh t t o pr edom inate so th at  all
searches  and seizures satisfy its comman d, whereas th e wa rr an t cla us e wou ld com e
in to pla y on ly w he n a  wa rr an t i s s ou gh t t o ju st ify go ver nm en t a cti on .”).
163. 750 P. 2d  121 9 (U ta h 1 988 ).
164. Id . a t  1221.  Since  the  Utah  Suprem e  Co ur t  m ade  th is  s ta tement ,  it  has
decided three cases wher e it chose to depart from th e federal standar d in  spi te  of t he
tex tua l simila rit y. See infra Par t III.B.3.
the close text u a l s im ila r it y be tween  the t wo con st it u t ion a l
provisions, th e Uta h Su prem e Court  ha s adopt ed th e genera l
ru le th at  th e two provisions sh ould mirr or each other
su bst an tive ly. In  State v. Watts,163 th e Uta h Su prem e Cour t
held  that  “Art icle I , sect ion 14 of the Uta h  C on s t itut ion reads
nea rly  verba tim  with  the fou r th am end men t [sic], an d t hu s t his
Cou r t  has  never dr awn  any dist in ct ion s b et ween  the p rotect ion s
afforded  by the r espective const itut ional provisions. Rath er,  the
Cou r t  has a lways  conside red  the p rotect ions afforde d t o be  one
and th e sa me .”164 Thus,  as a  genera l rule, th e Uta h Su prem e
Cou r t  will not  dr aw a  dist in ct ion  between  the con st it u t ion a l
p rovisions because  of their  t ext ua l s im ila r it y. But , t he Cour t
has recognized that  this  rule  does not  completely bar  Utah
cour t s from pa r t ing company with  the Un it ed S ta t es  Supreme
Cour t ’s in ter pr et a t ion  of th e F our th  Amen dm en t ; ins tead,  a s
the next  section  sh ows, th is is a  defau lt r u le which ma y be
disregarded in certain circumstan ces.
2. When  to depart  from the Watt s  rule
 T h e Watts Cour t  re cog n iz ed  t h a t  a lt h ou g h  t h e F ou r th
Amendment  and  Ar t icl e I , Sect ion 14 of t he  Utah  Cons t it u t ion
a re “nea r ly verba tim ,” th ere  likely will be s itu at ions ju st ifying
the Uta h  Cour t  in  making a  subs tan t ive in terp re tat ion  tha t
d iffe r s  from the  federa l coun te rpar t .  The  Cour t  cau t ioned tha t
[i]n  d e cl in i n g  t o depa r t  i n  t h i s  ca se  f rom our  cons i s t en t  r e fu s a l
h e r e to fo re  to in te rp re t a rt icle I , sect ion  14 of ou r con st itu tion
in  a  m a n n e r  d iffe r e n t  fr o m  t h e  fo u r t h  a m e n d m e n t  t o  t h e
fe d er a l con s t it u t ion , w e  h av e b y n o m e a n s r u le d  ou t  t h e
p ossib ility  of doin g so in  som e fu tu re  cas e. In de ed , choosing t o
g i v e th e U ta h  Con sti tu tion  a s om ew h at  d iff ere n t  con str u ction
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ C O O K -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
381] THIRD -PARTY CONSE NT TO SE ARCH 413
165. Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8 (empha sis  ad ded ) (cita tion s om itt ed); accord
Sta t e v. H ygh , 71 1 P .2d  264 , 27 3 (U ta h 1 985 ) (“The feder a l  [s e a r ch  and  se izure ] l aw
as it  currently exists is cert ain ly not  th e on ly p er mi ss ible  in te rp re ta ti on of t he  se ar ch
and se izu re p rot ect ions  cont a ined in t he Ut ah Cons titu tion. If after considera tion, we
conclude that we can str ike a balance between the competing interests involved so
as to bet ter  ser ve th em a ll, the n we s hould  not h esita te  to do so.”) (Zimm erm an , J .,
concur r ing ) (foot no te  om it te d).
166. S ee Sta te v. L ar occo, 742 P.2d 89, 95  n.7  ( Ut a h  C t . A pp. 1987) (refusin g to
depa r t  from the F ourth  Amendm ent s tan dard  because su ch a decision “should be
ann ounced by our  sta te’s sup rem e cour t, n ot th is Cour t”), rev’d on oth er gro u n d s, 794
P.2d 460 (Uta h 1990); see als o State v. Ja ckson 937 P.2d 545, 549 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (ho ld ing  tha t  t he Uta h C ons tit ut ion d oes n ot offer  mor e pr ote ction  th an  th e
Four th Amendment  in  garbage can sea rche s becau se th e federa l sta nda rd is a  fairly
c lea r , workab le  ru le) ; State v. Contr el, 886 P.2d 107, 111 (Uta h Ct. App. 1994)
(relying  on Watts i n  r efus ing  to hold tha t  t he  Utah  Const i t u t ion  r equ ir e s  knowing
con se nt ).
167. Stat es are fr ee to adopt their own constitut ional standar ds that  provide
more prot ection  th an  th e feder al F our th  Amen dme nt , bu t  “they m ay n ot pr ovide less .”
S immons v. South Ca rolina, 512 U.S. 154, 174 (1994); see also California v. Ramos,
463 U.S. 992, 1013S14 (1983) (“It is e lemen ta ry t ha t  S t ates are free to provide
greater  protections in their  criminal justice system t h a n  t he F ede ra l Con st itu tion
requires .”); Mich iga n v . Mos ley , 42 3 U .S.  96,  120  (197 6) (Br en na n,  J ., d iss en ti ng ) (“In
l igh t of to da y’s er osi on  of Miranda s t anda rds  a s  a  ma t te r  of federa l  const i tu t iona l
law, i t  is  appr opr iat e t o obse rv e t ha t n o St at e is  pr eclu ded  by t he  [ma jori ty’s] de cision
from  adher ing to higher sta ndar ds under  stat e law. Each Sta te ha s power to impose
higher  stan dard s governing police practices und er st ate la w th a n  is  r equ i r ed  by the
m a y pr ove t o  b e a n  app ropriate  m ethod for  insu lat in g this
s ta te ’s  c i t izens  f rom th e va ga ries  of in cons ist ent  in terp reta tion s
g iven  to  the  four th  am endm ent  by  the  f edera l  cour t s .165
After  th e Watts decision, Ut ah  appella te court s wer e free to
dr aw d is t in ct ion s b et ween  the U tah  and fe de ra l con st it u t ion s if
the in ter pr et a t ion s b y t he fede ra l cou r t s w er e s o in consi sten t
tha t  Ut ah  sh ould a dopt  a d ecision r esolvin g th e incon sist en cy.
Utah appel la te  cour t s , howeve r , h ave gen er a lly  refr a in ed  from
making any  dis t inct ion  and  have  le ft  the  t a sk  to the  Utah
Supreme Cour t .166
3. The Utah S upreme Court is willing to depart from  federal
Fourth Am endment law
 S in ce th e Watts decision , t h e  Ut a h  S u pr e m e C ou r t  h as
decided to par t compan y from the fed er a l  Four th  Amendment
s t anda rd on two occasions. Thus, in these two discrete areas,
Utah defen da nt s en joy more pr otect ion  unde r  Art icle  I, S ect ion
14 of the  Utah  Cons t itu t ion  than  under  the  federa l
coun te rpa r t .167 In  S ta te v . L ar occo,168 t he  Utah  Supreme Cour t
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Federa l Con st itu tion .”); Sims  v. Colle ction  Div. of t he  Ut ah  St at e Ta x Com m’n, 841
P.2d 6, 1 0 n .9 (U ta h 1 992 ) (“There i s no  ques t ion  tha t  a  s t a t e cons t it u t ion  mus t
provide at  lea st  th e s am e s cope of pr ote ction  as  th e fed er al con st itu tion . Des pit e ou r
borrowin g a  F ou r t h  Am e n dm ent  an alys is in  th is ca se,  we ob viou sly r ese rv e t he  opt ion
to provide broader protections under the stat e consti t u t i on  in t he  fut ur e.”); ROBERT
F . WI L L I AM S , ADVIS ORY COM M I S SI O N  O N  INTERGOVERN MENTAL RE L A TI O N S, STATE
CONS TITU TION AL LAW : CASES AND MATERIALS 68S69 (1988); William  J . Bren na n, J r.,
State Consti tutions and the Protections of  Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. RE V. 489,
502 (197 7) (a rg ui ng  th at  st at e cou rt  jud ges  sh oul d s crutinize federa l  const i tu t iona l
decis ions  by fede r a l c ou r t s and adopt th em only if they are per suasive, well-reasoned,
and ap pr opr ia te ly t ak e in to a ccou nt  th e u nd er lyin g con st it ut ion al  pr in cipl es ).
168. 794 P. 2d  460  (Ut ah  199 0).
169. S ee id . at 469S70.
170. S ee id . at 464S65 (“Were we deciding this case un der  federa l law, we wou ld
hold tha t a sea rch was conducted within  the m eaning of the fo u r t h amendmen t .
Ins tead of relying on feder al law , howeve r ,  we  ana lyze  th is  ques t ion  under  the  Utah
Con st it ut ion .”).
171. S ee id . at  469  (“Th is e xpa ns ion  [of th e a ut omob ile e xcept ion ] and  the
vaci lla tion  between  th e war ra nt  appr oach a nd t he r eason ablen ess a ppr oach h ave
resulted  in  s ign if ican t  con fus ion abou t feder al sea rch a nd s eizur e law r egar ding
au tom obil es .”).
172. Id . The U tah  Suprem e Cour t a rgu ably pa rt ed compa ny a  th ird t ime in  S im s.
In  S im s, the court, in a plu rality opinion, attem pted to extend t he e x cl u s io n a ry ru le
foun d in  La rocco to civil tax forfeiture pr oceedings: “We hold that  illegally seized
evid en ce mu st  be e xclu de d u nd er  ar ti cle I , se cti on  14 of t he  Utah  Cons t it u t ion  where
the proceeding in which exclusion is sought is quasi-criminal in na tur e or where th ere
is a par ticularized need for deterr ence to restr ain impr oper law enforcement
activit ies.” S im s, 841 P.2d at 14S15. However, it should be noted t ha t t he  opin ion of
t he Cou rt  “rep re sen ts  th e vie ws of on ly t wo ju st ices  . . . a nd  is t he re fore  not  th e la w
of the s t at e.” Id . at 15 (Stewar t, J., concurring). Because S im s i s a  p lu ra l it y  op in ion ,
I ha ve excluded  it from  th is section  of the a rt icle dealin g with  Utah case s th at  ha ve
took an expansive view of the Uta h  C on s t itu t ion  to hold tha t
when  a police officer, un der  nonemer gency circums ta nces,
opens a car  door t o look for t he vehicle identification nu mber ,
he commits a  sea rch  and  viola tes  the Utah  Cons t itu t ion  i f he
does not  posses s  a  war ran t.169 This holding represented a
depa r tu re from t rad it iona l  Four th  Amendment  law as  outlined
by th e Unit ed Sta tes Su prem e Cou r t .170 The Utah  Supreme
Cou r t  ju st ifie d i t s d ecis ion  to give defendan ts br oader
pr otection  on  the  bas is  tha t th e au tomobil e excep t ion  to the
Four th Amendmen t , as  a r t iculated by th e federal cour ts, was
too confusin g and  incons is t en t .171 Th er efor e, t h is  de cis ion
at tem pted  to “simplify, if possible, the sea rch a nd seizu re r ules
so tha t  they ca n  be  more easi ly foll owed b y t he p olice  a n d  t he
cour t s and , a t  th e sa me t ime, p rovide t he p ublic with consist ent
and predicta ble protection aga inst  un rea s on able searches and
seizu re s.”172
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depart ed f rom the f ede ra l i n t erp re t a tion  o f t he  Four th  Amendmen t .
173. 810 P. 2d  415  (Ut ah  199 1).
174. S ee id . at 418.
175. 425 U. S. 4 35 (1 976 ).
176. S ee id . at 442.
177. S ee Thom pson, 810 P.2d at 417.
178. S ee id . at 417S18 (notin g th at  Illinois , Colorad o, Pen nsylv an ia, a nd
Californ ia  re ject ed  th e fe de ra l r ul e).
179. S ee supra  Par t III.B.3.
The other  ca se in which t he Ut ah  Supr eme Cour t decided
n ot  t o follow the federal stan dard is S ta te v . T hom ps on .173 In
T hom pson , t he  cour t  ru led  tha t defen da nt s h ave  th e right  to be
free from un rea sonable sea rches a nd seizu res  of th ei r  bank
stat ements. 174 This decision directly cont ra dicted th e Unit ed
Sta tes  Supreme Court’s holdin g  in United S tates v. Miller175 in
which  th e Court  held t ha t t he governm ent  can seize ban k
recor ds  withou t  a  Four th  Amendme n t violation becau se a ba nk
depos itor  ha s n o rea sona ble exp ecta tion  of priva cy.176 The Utah
Supreme Cour t ju st ified its  holdin g on  the  grounds  tha t severa l
commenta tor s had h eavily cr iticized  Miller177 an d other  sta tes
tha t  ha d faced the iss ue h ad a lso rejected t he Miller holding
based upon their state constitut ions.178
These cases illustrate  the Uta h Suprem e Court ’s willingness
to address  th e issu e wh et he r t he re  ar e a ny s ub st an tive
differen ces between the Fourth Amendment a nd Art i cle I,
Section  14 of the  Ut ah  Const itu tion . With out  th is willin gnes s, it
would  be  fu t ile  for  a  de fen da nt  to argu e t ha t  su ch  a  di ffer en ce
exists because  the a rgu men t  wou ld  be  hea rd b y a  cour t  con t e nt
to follow an y in ter pret at ion of sear ch an d seizur e law pr offered
by th e Un ite d St at es S up re me  Cour t. Th ese ca ses  give hope to
defendan t s i n a  t h ird -pa r ty con s en t  case  because  they s how
tha t  t he  Utah  Supreme Cour t  will depar t  from the  federa l
s t anda rd when  th e appr opriat e criteria  ar e met .1 7 9  I n  fact, a s
the next  s ect ion  shows,  Utah  cour ts  h ave plea ded  for at tor ne ys
to appr opriat ely brief and a rgue wh eth er  Utah  shou ld adop t  an
indepen den t  t h ird -par ty consen t  s t andard so the  cour t s  can
answer  the  quest ion .
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180. S ee, e.g.,  St a t e v.  Du nn , 8 50  P .2 d 1 20 1,  12 16  n .1 1 (Utah  19 93 ) (“U tah
appel la t e court s gene ra lly will not a ddr ess a  sta te const itu t i on a l  a r gum en t m ad e for
t h e fir st  ti me  on  ap pe al .”); St at e v.  Ha m,  910  P. 2d  433 , 43 8 n .6 (U ta h C t.  App. 1996)
(refusin g to engage in a state constitut ional analysis because th e defendant  provided
“no sep a r a t e  a nalysis for the st ate const itut ional argu men t”); Stat e v. Bean, 869 P.2d
984, 988S89 (Utah  Ct . App. 1994) (“If a party fails to support his or her stat e
cons t i tu t iona l a rgumen t s with  an alysis  an d le gal  au th orit y th e a ppe lla te  cour t w ill n ot
address  th em .”); St at e v.  Arr oyo, 7 70 P .2d  153 , 15 4 n .1 (U ta h C t.  App . 19 89) (“[A]
thr ee line conclusory statement a s t o  th e gr ea te r s cope of s ta te  cons tit ut iona l
p rotect ions is a n in su fficien t b ri efin g for u s t o em ba rk  on a  st at e con st itu tion al
an alysis  an d w e, t he re for e, r efu se  to d o so. ”).
181. S ta t e v. C ar te r,  812  P. 2d  460 , 46 2 n .1 (U ta h C t.  App . 19 91).
182. S ee Wallent ine, supra  note  19, at  267 (argu ing t ha t t he U ta h ba r sh ould
quit  ignoring the “numerous and explicit invitations to brie f  Utah  const i tu t iona l
provisions” an d b egi n b ri efin g a nd  ar gu in g t he  sa me ).
183. 803 P. 2d  126 8 (U ta h C t.  App . 19 90).
184. Id . at  127 2 (qu oti ng  St at e v.  J oh ns on , 77 1 P .2d  326 , 32 8 (U ta h  Ct.  App.
198 9)).
C. Utah  Courts Ask A ttorneys to Brief and  Argue the Th ird-
Party Consent R ule
 U tah Court s consistently refuse to address whet her  Art icle
I, Section  14 of the  Ut ah  Const itu t ion shou ld be cons t rued
differen tly  from the  Four th  Amendment  because a t t orn eys fail
t o appr opriat ely brief a nd  a rgue  the ma t t e r .180 “Where a
defendan t  fails to support his st a t e  cons t itu t iona l  a rgument
with  ana lysi s or  l egal  au thor ity, t his court will not address
it.”181 Thus,  if a  defendan t  wa nts a  Ut ah  app ell a te cou r t  to hold
tha t  Article I, Section  14 of the  Ut ah  Const itu tion  gra nt s h im
more p rotect ion  than  does  the  Four th  Amendment  when  a  th ird
pa r ty consents t o a search of his property, he needs to ensu re
tha t  he fu lly bri efs a nd  ar gue s h is posit ion. Ot he rw ise, t he
court  will su mm ar ily reject h is claim .
Utah at torn eys do not appea r t o be get t i n g th e mess age.
They con t inue  to a rgue  for  a  d iffe ren t  s t a t e st an da rd , but  fail t o
brief th e cour t on a r at ionale tha t would ju stify t he
a rgumen t .182 F rus t ra ted  by  these  repea ted  unsu pported
argumen ts, cour t s  have ask ed at torn eys to fully brief and  a rgue
the st a te con st it u t ion a l is su e s o the cou r t  can  make an
appropr ia t e decision. In S tate v. Bobo,183 t he  Cour t  of Appea l s
chided the  de fendan t  for  making  a “nomina l a l lus ion”184 t o s t a t e
cons t itu t iona l r igh ts  with out  su ppor tin g th e ar gum ent  with
lega l au thor i ty . The cour t  warned  tha t  “[u ]n t i l such  t ime as
at torn eys heed t he ca ll of t he a pp ell a te cou rts  of t h is  s t at e  t o
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185. Id . (citations and footnotes omitted). The Utah Su prem e Cou rt ha s also
encouraged  at tor ne ys t o ful fill t he ir  rol e in  edu cat ing  th e cou r t  abou t  s t a t e
cons t i tu t iona l issu es. S ee St at e v.  Ea rl , 71 6 P .2d  803 , 80 6 (U ta h 1 986 ) (“It is
imper at ive tha t  U t a h  law yer s br ief [U ta h cou rt s] on  re leva nt  st at e con st itu tion al
qu es ti ons.”).
186. S ee supra  Par t III.B.3. & III.C.
187. S ee infra  Par t IV.A.1.
188. S ee infra  Par t IV.A.2.
189. S ee infra  Par t IV.A.3.
190. In  St ate v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272S73 n.5  (1990), th e U ta h C our t of
Appeals  sugges t ed th ree  areas  that  a t t or n eys  sh ould  an aly ze wh en  ar gu ing  “for an
inn ovative  in te rpre ta t ion  of a  s ta te con stit ut ional pr ovision [tha t is] te xtu ally sim ilar
to a feder al pr ovision.” Alth ough t hes e crite ria  seem  to spea k dir ectly  to a n ar ticle
l ike th is one, for t he r eason s discus sed below, I h ave chose n t o adopt on ly on e of t he
criter ia  as p ar t of my a na lysis. See infra Pa rt  IV.A.1
The first point the Bobo Cou rt  su gges te d, t ha t I  do n ot a ddress ,  is  an  inv ita tion
to coun se l t o “offer [a n] a na lys is of t he  un iqu e con te xt  in  wh ich  U t ah’s cons tit ut ion
developed, which is particularly german e in the search and se izure cont ext.” Bobo,
803 P.2d at  1272S73 n.5. I have decided not to use this criter i a  be ca u s e  it  appea r s
more fully brie f an d a rgu e th e ap plicabil it y  of t he  st a t e
cons t itu t ion , we cann ot meaningfully pla y  our  pa r t  in  the
judicia l l abora tory  of au tonomous  s ta t e  cons t it u t ion a l law
developm en t.”185
IV. ANALYSIS : SH O U L D  UTAH  AD O P T T H E  F E D E R A L  ST A N D A R D? 
A. Criteria Applicable in Decidin g Whether Federal Third -
Pa rt y Consen t L aw  S hould  be Incorp ora ted  as  Pa rt  of U ta h
Constitutional Law
As pr evious ly expr es se d,  the U tah  Su pr em e Cour t  has
shown  a  wil lin gn es s t o depar t  from federa l cour t s’
int erp ret at ion of t he  Four th  Amendmen t  and  par t icu la r ly  a
desir e to deter mine wh eth er  t o do so in  th ird -par ty consen t
cases.1 8 6  To make  a  sound  lega l  a rgument  in  favor  of depar t ing
from federal third-party consent law, an at torney must first
know the cr i te r ia  t ha t  a  U tah cour t  is  li ke ly  to ap ply in d eciding
the mat te r . Th is  Par t  p roposes tha t  Ut ah court s, in
dete rmin ing whe th er t o adopt  th e feder al t h ird-par ty consent
stan dards,  should addre ss w he th er  court s in  oth er  st at es h ave
adopted the federal standa rd,187 th e degree t o which the federa l
s t anda rd is in consist en t or  confusin g,1 8 8  and  the amoun t  of
crit icism t h a t  has been directed at t he federal standa rd.189
These factors  a re d rawn from sugges t ions  offe red  by  Utah
appel la t e cour t s190 and from criteria used by the  Utah  Supreme
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tha t  su bse qu en t a ppe lla te  court s h av e r efu sed t o apply it  as a  valid ba sis for findin g
a  dist inct ion between the  Utah and United S ta tes C onst itu tions . For in sta nce, in
State v. J ack son , 937 P.2d 545, 548S49 (Ut ah  Ct. App. 1 997), t h e  d ef en d a nt ar gued
tha t  Art icle I , Se ction  14 of t he  Ut ah  Con st itu tion  offer ed m ore  p rotect ion  than  the
United  St at es C ons tit ut ion i n r ela tion  to p olice s ea rch es of ga rb age  can s se t ou tsid e
the cur til age  of a h ome . To ju st ify t his  posi tion , th e de fen da nt  re fer re d t o th e h i sto ry
of U tah ’s  Mormon  se t t le r s . He  a rgued  that  since the y su ffere d a  long  his tor y of
per secu tion  an d inva sions of priv a cy by gov er nm en t s pon sor ed a gen ts , th e fr am er s of
the Ut ah  Con st itu tion  ha d a  “heig ht en ed a ppr ecia tion  for, an d valu at ion of, th e
pr iva cy rights in per sonal effects and, par ticularly, in the r ight to be  secure in one’s
own hom e.” Id. at 549. The Court  rejected this ar gumen t, noting th at ea ch time th e
Utah  Suprem e  C ou r t  has chosen t o depart from federal Four th Amen dment
interpretat ions, it has done so “for the pu rpose of establishing a more wo r k a bl e ru le
for  police  and t r ia l cou r t s than  ex is t s unde r  con fu sin g fed er a l case l aw. ” Id . Because
the Ut ah  Cou rt  of Appea ls h as  re ject ed t his  ar gu me nt , so d oes t he  au th or.
In  ad dit ion,  th e a ut hor  will n ot  a d d r ess the Bobo Court’s second area of analysis.
The court su ggested that attorneys sh ould  “dem ons tr at e t ha t s ta te  ap pel lat e cou rt s
regu la rly  int erpr et eve n t extu ally sim ilar  sta te const itu tiona l provisions  in a  ma nn er
different  from federa l inte rpr eta tions  of the U nit ed St at es Cons tit ut ion an d th at  it is
ent irely  prope r t o do so.” Bobo, 803 P.2d a t  1272-73 n.5. This Commen t has a lready
discussed the willingness th e Utah  Suprem e Cour t h as s hown in  int erpr etin g Article
I, Section 14 differently tha n th e Fourt h Amen dme nt . S ee supra Par ts III.B.2 &
III.B.3. Based on th at discussion an d given the Ut ah Su preme Cour t’s recent cases
tha t  move away from the fe d er a l search an d seizure sta ndar ds, this Commen t
assum es that  the Court would do so in the a rea of third-party con s e n t i f a  ca s e c am e
befor e it t ha t m er ite d t ha t con clus ion.
191. S ee infra  Par t IV.B.
192. S ee infra  Par t IV.C.
193. S ee infra  Par t IV.C.1.
Cou r t  in those cases in which the su preme court  has already
part ed company with t he federal Fourth Amendment  standa rd.
This  Pa rt  concludes  by ap plying  the p roposed cr i t er i a  to
federal  th i rd-par ty consen t  l aw191 to suggest t ha t t he U t ah
Supreme Court  should adopt the general federal third-party
common auth ority consent st anda rd as  pa r t  of the  Utah
Con st it u t ion ,192 bu t  shou ld not  com pletely incorporat e th e
apparen t  au th ority doctr ine.193 I n st ead,  the  Utah  Supreme
Cou r t  sh ould  adop t  a  lim it ed  ver sion of th e appa ren t  author i ty
doct r ine th at  re qu ire s police t o cond uct  a t hor ough
in ves t iga t ion  before t hey can  re ly on t he  ap pa re nt  au th orit y of a
consen t ing th ird  pa r ty.
1. Ot her s ta tes  hav e depa rt ed  from  fed era l Fourt h  Am endm ent
law
 Before a Ut ah  cour t decides whet h e r  t o depa r t  from federal
sea rch  and seizure standa rds and a dopt its  own m ore p rot ective
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194. 803 P. 2d  126 8 (U ta h C t.  App . 19 90).
195. Id . at 1272S73 n.5.
196. Id .
197. Id .
198. S ee Sta te v. T hom pson , 810 P.2d 415, 417S18 (U ta h 1 991); S ta te  v. La rocco,
794 P.2d 460, 465S66 (U ta h 1 990); see also Sim s v.  Colle cti on Div. o f t he  Utah  Sta t e
Tax Comm’n, 841 P.2d 6, 11S13 (U ta h 1 992 ).
199. 794 P.2d 460.
200. S ee id . at 469S71.
201. S ee id . at 465S66.
stan dards,  t he  cour t  shou ld fi r st  resea rch wh eth er oth er st at es
with  simila r  const it u t ion a l provis ion s h ave expressly r eached
the issue. This criteria  was  explicitly recommen ded by the  cour t
in  S tate v. Bobo.194 The  court  st at ed t ha t w he n a tt orn eys a rgu e
for  “an  innova t ive in terp re tat ion  of a  s t a te const i t u tion a l
provision ”195 th at  differs from t he federa l coun ter par t, th ey
should refer t o “au th ority from other  s t a t es  suppor t ing the
p a r ticular  cons t ruct ion ,”196 paying special attent ion to “those
sta tes  whose constitut ions ser ved  as  models for  the  Utah
Cons tit ut ion.”197
In  th e tw o cases in  which  t h e  Ut ah  Supreme Cour t  has
chosen t o m ake a n  in de pe nde nt  de ter min a t ion  of st a te s ea rch
and se izu re la w t ha t  de pa r ted  from the fede ra l cou r t s’
int erp ret at ion of the  Four th  Amendment ,  the Cour t e xplicitly
relied in pa r t  on  the  fact  t ha t  other st at es ha d done likewise.198
For  ins ta nce, in Larocco,199 th e Ut ah  Cour t in ter pr ete d Art icle
I, Sect i on 14 of the Ut ah  Constit ut ion to mean  th at  police ma y
not  open a car  door t o inspect th e vehicle ident ification nu mber
unless th ey ha ve a w ar ra nt  (or th er e a re  exigent
circumstan ces). This holding differed from federal court s’
int erp ret at ion of t he  Four th  Amendmen t .200 The Court  justified
its  depar tu re from federa l int erp ret at ion in pa rt  because st at es
like  Oregon, Hawa ii, New Hamps hi re,  and New York  each
rejected the  federa l s t andard in  favor  of an  approach  tha t  gave
defendan ts  more  protect ion .201
Obvious ly, Uta h courts sh ould not blindly follow the
dete rmina t ions of other  st a te  cour t s  bu t  shou ld scru t in ize the
other holdings with t he same int ensity ap plied to th e federal
in terp re tat ion . Sim ilar ly, Ut ah  court s sh ould not  merely add  up
the number  of other  st a te  cour t s  tha t  have depar ted  from the
federa l ru le a nd  follow t he  re as onin g of the  ma jorit y. In s t ea d,
th i s factor  shou ld be use d i n  con junct ion  with  the othe r  two
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202. S ee infra  Par t IV.A.2. and P art  IV.A.3.
203. S ee L arocco , 749  P. 2d a t 4 69 (ju st ifyin g t he  dep ar tu re  from  fede ra l se ar ch
and sei zu re l aw a s an  ef for t  to s im pl ify t he r u le s “so  t h at  t h e y c an be m ore ea sily
followed by th e police and  th e court s an d, at  th e sam e tim e,  pr o vi de  t he  publ ic  wi th
consistent  an d p re dict ab le p ro te cti on  ag ai ns t u nr ea son ab le s ea rch es  an d s eiz ur es ”).
204. S ee id .
205. S ta t e v. Watts, 750 P .2d 1219, 1221 n.8  (Ut ah  1988 ); see also supra Pa r t
III.B.
206. La rocco, 794 P.2d at  469.
crit eria 202 an d sh ould not be  ind epen den tly dis posit ive. Thu s, if
th e feder al s ta nd ar d is r elat ively clear an d ha s received no real
cr i t icism, th en  th e Ut ah  court  decidin g th e m at te r ou ght  to
in te rpre t t he  st a t e  cons t it u t ion  the  same as the  Federa l
Con st it u t ion , so as  to avoid crea t ing  confu s ion  for  lowe r  cour t
judges, the police, an d  the ba r .203 Conversely, if th e federal
s t anda rd is  unclea r  and h ea vily cr it icized , t he U tah  cour t
shou ld be willing to depa rt  from th e federal st an dar d, even
th ough it is t he first  sta te court  to addr ess t he pa rt icular issu e.
2. Inconsistent or confusin g interpretations of federal Fourth
Am endment law
 O n e of t h e  m os t  im por ta n t  fa ct or s  u s ed  by  t h e U t ah
Supreme Cour t  t o just ify i t s d ep ar ture fr om fed er a l sea rch  and
seizu re  law in  th e  pa s t  h as b een  the d egr ee  of confusion  the
ar ea  of law im poses  on t he  police, th e defendan t , an d societ y.204
The Watts cour t  e loquently expressed the idea that  in those
s itua t ions in  which  the Four th Amendment  i s too confus ing , the
Ut a h  court s would be justified in simp lifying the la w un der
Art icle I, Sect ion 14 of th e Ut ah  Cons tit ut ion: “[C]hoosin g to
give the  Utah  Cons t itu t ion  a  s om ewha t d ifferent  const ru ction
may p rove to be an  appropr ia t e  method for  insu la t ing  th is
sta te’s citizens from the vagar ies  of incons is tent  in terp re tat ions
given to the  four th  amendment by th e feder al cour ts .”205 I n  fact ,
one of the primar y reasons the Utah Su preme Court decided to
in te rpre t Article I,  Se ct ion  14 di ffer en t ly t han  the F our th
Amendmen t , with respect to automobile sea r ch es , i s the
“sign ificant  confus ion  about  federa l sea rch  and  seizure  law
r e ga r ding au tom obiles.”206 Thu s, if a Uta h Cour t det erm ines
tha t  th ere is a h igh degree of confusion with  respect to third-
pa r ty consen t  s ea rches,  tha t  cour t is  just ified in in ter pr etin g
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207. S ta t e v. T ho mp son , 81 0 P .2d  415 , 41 7 (U ta h 1 991 ).
208. Id .
209. S ee id . at 418.
210. S ee supra  notes 46S47 and  accompanying t ext .
211. S ee supra  notes 49S52 and  accompanying t ext .
212. S ee supra  Par t II.B.3.
213. S ee Katz v. United States, 389 U .S. 3 47,  361  (196 7) (H ar la n,  J ., con cur ri ng ).
the Ut ah  Cons t it u tion in a  way th at  elimina tes confusion, even
i f tha t  means going aga ins t  Four th  Amendment  in terp re tat ion .
3. Crit ici sm  ai m ed at  th e fed era l s ta ndar d  in  ligh t of  sea rch
an d  seizu re p olicy con sidera ti ons
 Before a  s t a t e court  decides whether t o depart  from a
par t icu la r fede ra l Four th  Amendmen t  st anda rd,  the  cour t
shou ld exa min e t he ext en t  to wh ich  the fede ra l decis ion  has
been criticized by judges and commenta tors . In  the mos t  recen t
Utah case depar ting from federa l Fourt h Amen dmen t
stan dards,  th e Ut ah  Su pr em e Cour t r elied, in  pa rt , on  the  fact
tha t  th e feder al s ta nd ar d h ad  “been  rou nd ly crit icized.”207 The
Thom pson  cour t  ci t ed  severa l  leading commenta tors  who
condemned the U nit ed  St a tes  Su pr em e Cour t ’s  r u ling tha t  “a
depositor  ha s no legitimat e expectat ion of privacy in his ba nk
records.”208 As  a  r esu lt ,  t he  Utah  Supreme Cour t  decl ined to
adopt th e federal st an dar d an d chose, instea d, to inter pret
Ar t icle  I, S ect ion  14 in  a  wa y t ha t  pr otect ed  ba nk recor ds .209
In  th e third-par ty conse nt  context , Ut ah  court s sh ould
pa r t icu lar ly focus  thei r  at t en t ion  on  a rgumen t s t ha t  a t t ack  t he
p r imary r a t iona le s for  consen t  s ea rches.  For  i ns t ance , cou r t s
shou ld examine whether federal third-party  consen t  doct r ine
u n d u ly relies on tra ditional notions of propert y law,210 whet her
it  leaves  a d efend an t’s r ight  to be fre e from u nr eas ona ble
sear ches to the “unfettered discretion” of a third pa rty ,2 11
whet her  the doctrine ta kes accoun t  of t he  de fendan t ’s
as su mp tion  of risk, 212 or  whether  the th i rd-par ty consen t
doct r ine un fair ly tr am ples on  th e defen da nt ’s r eas ona ble
exp ect a t ion  of priva cy.213 In  ad dit ion, court s should also
dete rmine whet her  th e criticisms of third-par ty consent
doct r ine at ta ck the u nder lying policy consider a t i ons  of the
Four th Amendm ent  genera lly, consider ing for exam ple,
wheth er  th e doctr ine lea ves t he d ecision t o cond uct  a s ear ch in
the hands of an  offi ce r  cha rged wit h “ferr et ing ou t cr ime ,”
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214. Johnson  v. United St ates , 333 U.S. 10, 13S14 (1 948 ).
The point of the Four th Amendm en t , wh ich oft en  is n ot gr as ped  by ze alou s
officers, is n ot t ha t it  den ies  law  en force me nt  th e su ppor t of  th e  u s ua l
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in  requirin g that  those inferences  be drawn  by a neut ral an d detached
mag is t r a t e inst ead of bein g judged by t he officer engaged in t he often
competit ive en te rp ri se  of ferr etin g ou t cr im e. An y a ss um pt ion  th at  evid en ce
su ff ic ien t to support a magistrate’s disinteres ted deter minat ion to issue a
sea rch  war ran t  wi ll  ju s t ify the officer s in  ma kin g a s ea rch  wit hou t a
war ran t would reduce the Ame ndmen t to a nu llity and leave the people’s
homes  secure only in the discretion of police officers.
Id . (foot no te s om it te d).
215. S ee Un ited  Sta tes  v. Leon, 46 8 U.S. 897, 957S58 (1984) (Bren na n, J .,
dissen tin g) (ar gu in g t ha t t he  good -fa ith  exception t o the  war ra nt  requ irem ent  will
“unde rmine the int egrity of the warra nt pr ocess” because i t  do es  n ot  give  th e po lice
adequa te in cen ti ve t o pr ove p ro ba ble  cau se  to a  ma gis tr at e).
216. S ee generally Pete rsen  v. People, 939 P.2d 824, 827S30 (Col o. 1997)
(adoptin g Mat lock  test ); Saavedra v. St ate, 62 2 So.2 d 9 52,  957  (Fl a.  199 3) (s am e);
S ta t e v. R at ley , 82 7 P .2d  78,  81 (K an . 19 92) (“After  revie wing Ma tlock , cas es fr om
other  jurisdictions, an d Kans as case law, we h old that  in Ka ns as , sp ou sa l consen t  t o
sea rch  cases should be a pproached on a  case-by-case ba sis  u s ing  a  common  au thor i ty
or  su fficien t r ela tion sh ip t est .”); In re Tariq A-R-Y, 701 A.2d 691, 695 (Md. 1997)
(“Seizing  upon  the  language  in  Fra zier , Coolidge,  and Matlock , Mar ylan d court s ha ve
gener ally held that one who shares with others access to, ownersh ip of, or  posses sory
r igh t s over pr opert y necess ar ily enjoys a d imin ished  expecta tion of priva cy ther ein .”).
instead of a  “neu t r al  and  de t ached deci sion  maker ,”21 4  or  t he
degree to which th e doctr ine gives an officer the in centive to
conduct  a  s ea rch  in s t ead  of p rocur ing a  s ea rch  war ran t .215
B. Application of the Proposed Criteria to Federal 
Third-Party Consent Law
1. Other states have departed from  federal Fourth 
Am endment law
a. Mat lock  com m on auth ority standa rd . Modern th ird-
pa r ty consen t law, governed by t he Matlock common  au thor i ty
test  ha s pr oved t o be a w ork ab le, us efu l te st . Conse qu en tly,
s t a t e cour t s  have  chosen  to in corpora t e  t he  fede ra l s t anda rd
in to th i rd-part y  conse n t  ana lys is  ba se d on  st a te con st it u t ion a l
law.216 These st at e cour ts h ave ad opted th e Matlock test
gener ally becau se th ey ha ve ha d lit tle p roblem  imp leme nt ing
the s tanda rd  whe n fa ced wit h t he q ues tion  whe th er t he t hir d
pa r ty had  au thor i ty to consen t  to a  se a r ch  of t he  de fendan t ’s
pr oper ty.  In a ddition, th ere is  little or no debat e over wha t
cons t it u t e s common  a u t horit y since t he in quir y is ess ent ially
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217. United  St at es  v. M at lock , 41 5 U .S.  164 , 17 1 n .7 (1 974 ).
218. So f ar ,  three sta tes, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Oregon, have rejected the
federa l a ppa ren t a ut hor ity doct rin e. S ee Stat e v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 903 (Haw.
199 5); Stat e v. Wright, 893 P.2d 455, 460S61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (reject ing  doct r ine
of appa ren t a ut horit y); Stat e v. Will, 885 P.2d 715 , 719 (Or. Ct . App. 1994) (“Although
appa ren t  aut hority is now su f fi ci en t  unde r  t he  Four th  Amendmen t ,  actua l  au tho r ity
to gra nt  consent  is stil l  r eq u ire d u nd er  Art icle I , se ction  9 [of th e Or egon
Const itu tion ].”) (citation omitt ed); Kath leen M. Wilson, S ta te Con st itu tion al L aw —N ew
Mex ico Rejects Apparent Aut hority to Con sent as a Valid Basis for Warrantless
Searches: Stat e v. Wright, 26 N.M.  L. RE V. 571 (1996). But see Sta te v. McCa ugh ey,
904 P.2d 939, 944 (Idaho 1995) (explicitly adopting the R odr igu ez  a ppa ren t  au tho ri ty
standa rd); Mye rs  v. S ta te , 564  N.E . 2d  287 , 290  (In d. 1 990 ) (“Beca us e  ou r  cour t s  have
in  the past  followed United Stat es Supreme Court  pre ce d en t  in t his a rea , we will
con t inue to do so and apply the R odr igu ez  ana lys is  t o t he ca se a t b ar .”) (cita tion
om it te d).  
219. 896 P. 2d  889  (Ha w. 1 995 ).
220. S ee id . at  903. 
221. S ee articles cited supra  note 88.
whet her  the th ird party had s u ch  a  re la t ionsh ip  with  the
p roper ty tha t  he  cou ld  h a ve consen ted  to a  sea rch  of it “in h is
own  r igh t .”217 Once t ha t cr iter ia  i s met  and the re i s no evide nce
of coer cion , s t a te cou r t s gene ra lly hold tha t  t he th ird -pa r ty
consent is valid.
b. Rodriguez apparen t  au thority stand ard . The R odrigu ez
apparen t  au thor i ty  st anda rd,  however , has not  far ed a s well
among the sta te court s. Because of the intense criticism that
followed the  Supreme  Cour t ’s decision in R odrigu ez , some
sta tes  ha ve decided t o move away from the  federa l “apparen t
au thor i ty” s t anda rd  an d a dopt  a d ifferent  st an da rd  un der  th eir
s t a t e cons t it u t ion s. 218 For  i ns t ance , r e ly ing on  it s  s ta t e
con s t it u t ion , th e Ha waii S up rem e Cour t in  State v. Lopez219
rejected the  concept  of apparen t  au thor i ty and  held tha t  a  t h ird
pa r ty can  give  effect ive  cons e nt  t o a  s ea rch  of t he  de fendan t ’s
p roper ty only if h e has actual au thority to do so.220 Given th e
host ility ma ny comment at ors feel toward t he R odrigu ez
holdin g,221 i t  i s l ike ly  tha t  othe r  st a t e cour t s w ill  a lso reject
apparen t  au thor i ty under  their  sta t e con st it u t ion s in  favor  of a
stan dard th at offers more protection to criminal defendant s.
2. Inconsistent or confusin g interpretations of federal Fourth
Am endment law
a. Mat lock com m on auth ority stand ard . The Matlock test
is a r elat ively clea r  t e st  tha t  cour t s  have  had l it t l e t roub le
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222. S ee LAF AVE , supra  note 34., at § 8.3(c). The issues an d hypotheticals ra ised
by P ro fes so r  LaFave seem to be more of an academ ic critique of the th e Suprem e
Cour t ’s th ir d-pa rt y con se nt  cas es  an d le ss  of an  exa mi na ti on i nt o act ual  f laws in  the
test  f rom ac tua l cour t  cases .
223. S ee id .
224. S ee id . at  § 8.3 (d).
225. S ee id . at  § 8.4(a ); see also supra note 102.
226. These i s sues  a re a lso ou ts ide  th e scop e of t his  ar ticl e. F or a  look a t h ow
som e courts ha ve resolved these issues, see LAF AVE , supra  note 34, at  § 8.3.
227. Illinois  v. R odr igu ez,  497  U. S. 1 77,  186  (199 0).
228. Compare Un ited  Sta tes  v. Brok aw, 98 5 F.2d  951, 954 (8th  Cir. 1993)
(va l ida t ing consent  sear ch by the defenda nt’s landlord, even th ough th e defendan t was
h om e at t he time) with  Unit ed Sta tes v. Brown, 961 F.2d 1039, 1041 (2 d Cir. 1992)
( inva lida t ing a co ns en t s ea rch  by t he  de fen da nt ’s lan dlor d).
applying.  Al though  the common au thor i ty s t andard i s fa i rly
s t r a ight forward and ea sy  to app ly in  most  si tua t ion s,  Profes sor
LaFave raises sever a l is su es  tha t  sh ow t ha t  the com mon
au thor i ty standa rd does not adequat ely handl e  a ll possible
situations.222 For inst an ce, how s h ou ld a  cour t ,  app ly ing
Matlock , decide wheth er t hird -part y consen t is valid wh en t he
defendan t  spe cifically in st ru cts t he  th ird  pa rt y to n ot gr an t
consen t ,223 when the defendant is presen t  and ob ject s  to the
search ,224 or  wh en  one s pou se  gr an t s con se n t  to a  s ea r ch  of the
othe r ’s pr oper ty d ur ing a  tim e of ma rit al h ostilit y.225 These
issues  a re  not  read ily answ er ed  by a  simple a pp lica t ion  of th e
Matlock  t e st ,226 bu t  they d o ra ise im por tan t  qu es t ion s a bou t
whet her  such a test  can answer a ll third-party consent  cases. In
sp it e of the se qu est ions (t ha t d o not h ave  clear an swers ),  the
Matlock common  au thor i ty  te st  has  proven  to be a  u seful a nd
effective test t o determ ine th e validity of th ird-par ty consent .
b. Rodriguez apparent a uth ority standa rd . The R odrigu ez
appa r e n t a u thor ity d octrin e, howe ver , ha s n ot bee n a s ea sy t o
ap ply. Th e s t anda rd n ecess a r ily requ ir es  cour t s t o condu ct  an
in tense factua l i nqu iry  to deter m ine whet her  th e officer
“rea sona bly (though  er roneou sly) be lie ve[d ] tha t  the p er son  wh o
has consen ted” to the  sea rch  had  au thor i ty  to do so.227 This
fa ct u a l d et er m i n a t ion  l ea d s  t o a n ot h e r  p oten t ia l
pr oblem—det erm inin g wh at  qu a lifies  as a  rea son able but
mist ak en  belief by an  offi ce r  a s t o t he  thi rd pa r ty’s  au thor i ty
depends upon who is  evaluating the facts. The stan dard is so
fraught with s ubjectivity tha t t her e is a potent ial for t wo
sepa rat e cour t s  to make  oppos it e  findings  given  near ly the
sam e set  of fact s. 228 Con se qu en t ly,  the U tah  Su pr em e Cour t
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229. S ee Wieber, supra  note 88, at  619S632 (criticizing the R odr igu ez  appa ren t
au thor i ty st an da rd  in  pa rt  bec au se  of th e con fus ion  gen er at ed  in  th e low er  cou rt s).
230. S ee supra  notes 222S26 and  accompanying t ext .
231. S ee generally ar ticl es ci te d in  footn ote  88. T his  ar ticl e doe s n ot p u r p or t  t o
give an exhaustive summ ary of the substan tive criticisms waged aga ins t  t he  appa ren t
au thor i ty doctrin e. The p ur pose of this  Pa rt  is twofold: first, t o highligh t  t h e major
criticisms and  second , t o  il lu s t r a t e  t ha t  t he  appa ren t  au thor i t y s t andar d has been
hea vily criticized.
232. Illinois  v. R odr igu ez,  497  U. S. 1 77,  194  (199 0) (Ma rs ha ll, J ., d iss en ti ng ).
shou ld critically exam ine th e ap p a r en t  au thor i ty  doct r ine  to
det e rmine the  a reas  tha t  cause confus ion  and  cra ft  a  ru le tha t
clea r s u p t ha t  confusion .229
3. Crit ici sm  ai m ed at  th e fed era l s ta ndar d  in  ligh t of  sea rch
an d  seizu re p olicy con sidera ti ons
a. Mat lock com m on auth ority standa rd . The common
au thor i ty doct r ine as  ou t l ined in  Matlock has r ece ived l it t le or
no crit icism  from  jud ges,  pr act it ion er s,  or  commen ta tors.  Since
its  incept ion in  1974, state an d federal court s have applied the
test  wit h  r elat ive ea se t o det er min e t he  valid ity of consen t b y a
th ird par ty. Although t he Matlock test  does n ot  effectively
address  a ll  t hi rd-pa r ty consen t  issues,2 3 0 it ha s proved to be a
work able  and logical fra mew ork t o judge t he va lidit y of th ird -
part y consent cases.
b. Rodriguez apparent a uth ority standa rd . Unlike the
holdin g in Mat lock , th e Un ited  St at es Su pr eme  Cour t’s r ulin g
in  Il linois  v.  R odrigu ez  ha s been  heavily criticized by
commentat or s.231 Th ose  wh o have cr it icized  the Cour t ’s
“apparen t  author ity” doctr ine  have focused thei r  a t tacks on  the
not ion  tha t  i t  unduly t ramples  on  Four th  Amendment
protections. Chief among t he criticizers were t he R odrigu ez
dissenters, J ust ices Mars ha ll, Brenna n, an d Steven s. They
cont end  tha t  t he ma jor i ty  began  with  the wron g prem ise.
Accordin g to the d is se n ter s,  th ir d-p ar ty con se n t  case s p r ior  to
R odrigu ez  wer e decided  out side of th e re as ona blen ess cla us e of
the Fourth Amendment  because th ey were based on  the n otion
tha t  th e defen da nt  “volun ta rily has r elinqu ish ed som e of his
exp ect a t ion  of priva cy by  sh a r ing a ccess or cont rol over h is
p roper ty wi t h  a noth er  per son.”232 Thu s, by basing its a ppa ren t
au thor i ty decision on t he r eas ona blen ess p ron g, th e ma jority
r elies on a n  en t ir ely  “differ en t  cons t it u t ion a l foot in g” from  t h a t
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233. Id .
234. Davies, supra  not e 88 , at  59; see also Wieber , supra no t e 88,  a t  619 ( argu ing
tha t  the Supr eme Court’s decision in R odr igu ez  “s ign if ican tly changed  the
‘reasonableness’ la nd sca pe ”).
235. R odr igu ez , 497  U. S. a t 1 98 (M ar sh al l, J ., d iss en ti ng ).
236. S ee Davie s, supra  note 88, at  25.
237. S ee id . at 25S45.
238. Cam pbell, supra  note 88, at  499.
239. Wieber , supra  note 88, at  620.
under lying tra ditional third-party consent cases.233 Oth er
commenta tor s have a lso at t acke d t he m ajor it y’s a na lys is  of th e
reasonableness p rong,  arguing tha t  it  “s t r ays  a  long way from
t h e t r a d it i on a l  u n de r s t a nd in g  of F our th  Amendm en t
re as ona blen ess .”234
The R odrigu ez  dissenters also a t ta ck th e ma jority opin ion
because  it  “ignores  the le git im ate expect a t ion s of p r iva cy on
which  individua ls ar e ent itled  to r ely.”235 This is due, in part ,
because  th e Cour t’s h olding sh ift s  the focus  away  from the
individual defendant ’s pr ivacy interest t o the individual
officer’s conduct .236 This ch a nge of focus an d r esu ltin g
den igra tion  of defendant s’ pr ivacy interest is viewed as
una cceptable to man y legal commentat ors.237
Fin ally,  some comm ent at ors ha ve opined th at  th e R odrigu ez
apparen t  au th ority doctr ine gives the p olice a  nega tive
incent ive: inst ead of investigat ing th e facts to deter m i ne
whet her  th e con s en t ing pa r ty has  au thor i ty  to g ran t  e ffect ive
consen t , police officers h ave th e “incen tive  to r ema in  ignoran t  of
[the th ird  pa rt y’s] tr ue  st at us .”238 The a rgu m e n t rest s  on  the
not ion  that  since police are a llowed  to cond uct  a  search if t he
in forma t ion  abou t t he p ar ty’s a ut hor ity t o cons ent  is objectively
rea son able , t hen  officer s w ill  not  in qu ir e in to the t rue n a ture of
the consen t ing p a r ty’s a u thor it y. As  lon g a s t he office r s ca n
dem ons t r a t e “‘re as ona ble belie f,’” th e ar gumen t goes, “th ere is
no incen t ive to t ake  fu r the r mea sur es to dete rmine  whe ther  the
person who claims sh ar ed au th ority ha s actu al au th ority over
th e pr em ises .”239
Given th e host of criticism wa ged again st t he R odrigu ez
holdin g, st at e cour ts  sh ould b e wa ry a bout  incorp ora tin g th e
de cis ion  in to the ir  s t a te cons t itu t iona l  framework  withou t
scru t in iz ing its  ra tion ale . Because  many  cr i t ics  of the  apparen t
au thor ity doctr ine ha ve a view of th e Four th  Amendm ent  th at
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240. S ee State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah  1985) (“In man y cas es , t he
exc lus iona ry ru le, adopt ed by th e federa l court s as  th e sole re med y for fou r th
amendmen t  violations, appear s to have influenced, if not controlled, th e s cope  of th e
cons t i tu t iona l ri gh t i t w as  de sig ne d t o fur th er . Ma ny  of th e a r c a ne rules developed
t o j u st ify warra ntless searches seem t o have been fashioned solely to avoid th e
consequences of th e e xclu sio na ry  ru le. ”) (Zimm er ma n,  J ., con cur ri ng ).
fundamenta l ly differs from t he m ajority of th e Supr em e Cour t ,
th ey will likely not be satisfied unless R odrigu ez  is complet ely
overruled. Th is  Com men t  doe s n ot  es pou se  tha t  pos it ion .
Instead,  it su ggests t ha t t he R odrigu ez  hold in g be  sca led  ba ck
so th at  it pr ovides m ore protection to defendant s, give s p olice
the proper incentives, and re du ce s t he ability of judges to use
the “a p p a rent au thority” doctrine as a t ool to avoid the harsh
effects of th e exclusiona ry ru le.240
C. Recom m endation
 T h e U t a h  Supreme Cour t  shou ld incorpora te  the Matlock
s t anda rd in to Art icle  I, S ect ion  14 of t he Utah  Cons t itu t ion .
The Matlock st an da rd  ha s been  in  use for  over  two decades , and
dur ing tha t t ime, cour ts  ha ve su ccessfully ap plied it  to
nu mer ous fact  s it ua t ions  and have  genera lly a r r ived  a t  cor rect
results. Also, as discus sed above, the Matlock test  ha s been
accepted by sta te a nd federa l cour ts a nd h as pr oved to be a
work able  st anda rd t ha t  t akes  account  of gen er a l F our th
Amendment  prin ciples. In addit ion, the Matlock s t andard has
re ceived no subst an tial crit icism. Given t hese facts, t he Ut ah
Cou r t  sh ould  not  crea te con fusion  by r eject in g  t h e Matlock test
or  chang ing  it s  appl ica t ion  in  any  sign i fi can t  way.
The R odrigu ez  st anda rd,  however , should  not  receive the
same tr eat men t. Sever a l  stat e courts have expressly refused to
adopt i t  a s  pa r t  of t he ir  s t a t e cons t it u t iona l s ea rch  and  se izure
law, op t ing  ins tead  for  the  actua l  au thor i ty s t andard found in
Matlock. In addition, the appar ent au thority standa rd is often
difficult  to apply becaus e of th e inten se fa ct u a l an alys is
requ ired  and  the ext r emely  subjective nat ur e of th e ru le.
Fin ally,  th e doctr ine h as  been  hea vily criticized by judges and
comment ators.
In  the past , when these sa me n ega t ive  factors were  pre sen t ,
the Utah  Supreme Court has depar ted fr om  the  fede ra l Four th
Amendment  st anda rd a nd h as inst ea d given  more p rotect ion
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241. S ee supra  Par t III.B.3.
242. S ee supra no te 218  and accompany ing  t ex t .
243. S ee infra  Par t IV.C.3.
244. The au th or re cognizes th at , often t ime s, de t e rmin ing the  fac ts  su r round ing
a  cons en t s ea rch  can  be d ifficul t. W he n a  cour t is  call ed u pon  to decide whe the r  the
de fendan t or t hir d pa rt y act ua lly ga ve con sen t, t he  pr im ar y sou rce  for e vidence o f t he
fac ts is based on the t estimony of the part ies involved: the police officer wh o
request ed the consent a nd th e defendant or t hird par ty who supposedly gave the
unde r  the  Utah  Cons t itu t ion .241 Wit h  the p res en ce of t hese
adverse e lemen t s  in  t he  appa ren t  author i ty  cont ext , it is lik ely
tha t  the U tah  Cou r t  wil l n ot  adop t  the t es t  wh olesa le. The
Cou r t  will th us  ha ve tw o options: firs t ,  it m ay follow Haw aii,
Oregon , an d New Mexico an d simp ly refuse to recognize the
doctr ine;242 or , second , it m ay s imp ly limit  its  ap plicat ion. This
Commen t  argues tha t th e latter is the better appr oach because
it  a llow s t he p olice  to rely  on a  rea son able  bu t  mis taken  fact ,
bu t only after t hey ha ve done all th ey can rea sonably be ask ed
to do to remove any doub t  t h a t the  consen t ing th i rd pa r ty has
actua l au thor i ty  to gr an t va lid consen t. In her ent  in t his
proposa l i s the  not ion  tha t  the  doct r ine of appa ren t  au thor i ty  is
a  ben eficial tool used  by th e police as lon g as  it is  ap plied in  a
way tha t  compor t s  with  the  Four th  Amendment .243
1. Proposal
 The Utah  Supreme Court should not complet ely r eject  the
apparen t  author i ty doct r ine  and ins t ead  shou ld adop t  a limited
ver sion  of the federal stan dard. The revised s t and ar d sh ould
a llow  officers t o rea sona bly rely on mistak es of fact proffered by
the consen t ing th ird pa rt y, but only after  th e officer h as m ade a
deliberat e and  thorough exa mination of the consenting person
to deter mine whet her  he does have auth ority. In other words,
before an  officer  is  pe rmit t ed  to search the p rope r ty of a
defendan t  based on consent by a third pa rty, the officer mu st
first  th oroughly quest ion the t hird  par ty to det erm ine th e
pa r ty’s au thor i ty to g ran t  the  consen t .  If,  a ft e r  su ch  a qu er y, a
rea sona ble officer would  ha ve no r eas ona ble doubt  tha t  the
person g ran t ing  consen t  has a u thor i ty to do so and  none  of the
sur rounding facts or circumstances w ou ld lea d a  rea sona ble
officer  to belie ve oth er wise, t he  sea rch  is pe rm issib le, even  if it
l a te r tu rn s out t ha t t he cons en tin g par ty d id  not  have the
au thor i ty to consen t .244 I f,  on  the  othe r  hand , a  r eas on able
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consent. Because “[c]onsent cases often  com e dow n t o a cr edi bilit y de te rm ina tion
between  the officer’s account of what  happ ened a nd th e defendan t’s account of what
happened,” c ou r t s “rou tin ely fin d officer s t o be m ore  cre dibl e t ha n d efen da nt s” or
th i rd par ties .  SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 3, at  362.  Th u s, it is often  difficult
for  th e con se nt in g pa rt y t o pr ove e xa ctl y how the officer extracted consent a nd
wheth er  an  o ff icer  conducted  an  adequa te in ter rogat ion pr ior to condu cting t he
consent  sea rch . B e ca u se police are  gener ally consider ed to be m ore cred ible by th e
cour t s and t hey have a n inter est in ens uring t hat  evidence t he y h ave  gat he re d is  not
suppressed,  some have su ggested tha t police officers reg ula rly  lie on t he s ta nd. S ee
id . a t  362S63. In fa ct, one r eport  ass ert s th at  “perjur y is so ‘preva lent  in t he  [New
York  Ci ty P ol ice]  De pa r tmen t  tha t  it  has it s own n ickname:  ‘te st il yi ng. ’ ” Id . at 363
(quotin g J oe Sext on, New York  Pol ice Oft en  Lie Under Oath, Report Says , N .Y.  TI M E S,
April  22, 1994, at A1). This Commen t purposely omits a proposal regardi ng  th is  is sue
as it is outside the scope of this Commen t.
245. The R odr igu ez  case, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), p rov ides  an  appropr ia te factua l
ba ckd rop  to illust ra te t he t ypes of ques tions  police officers sh ould as k to t est a  th ird
par ty’s aut hority to consent to a sea rch of the defendant ’s property. The officers  in
R odr igu ez  could have ask ed th e consentin g woman qu est ion s like: “Do you live in th e
apa r tment?” “When  was  the  la s t  t ime  you  were  in  t h e  a pa r t men t?” “Did  the  de fendan t
give you t he  ke y to t he  ap ar tm en t?” “Are a ny  of your  poss es sion s in  th e a pa rt me nt ?”
“Did th e de fen da nt  kick  you ou t of t he  ap ar tm en t a nd  te ll you  neve r  t o r e tu rn?” “Who
is paying rent for the apar tment ?” “If you no longer live in the apa rt me nt , how  often
do you visit and did the defendan t give you free access t o  h is  apa r tmen t  when  he
gave  you the key?” “Do you regularly sta y overnight or for extended periods of tim e?”
246. Obviously,  if the officer can fin d an othe r ba sis on wh ich to valid a t e  t he
warran tless sear ch with out t he pa rt y’s consen t (like in  an  exig en t  cir cum st an ce, for
example) he is ju stified in  doing so. Th is proposa l addr esses  only th os e  s it u a t ions in
wh ich  the sea rch is based solely on valid consent.
officer  would harbor some doubt as t o t he  pe r son’s  au thor i ty  to
g r a n t consent, and t he officer cannot justify the search under
an other  exception t o the wa rr an t claus e, the officer mu st eit her
conduct  fu r the r  inqu iry  in to the  p a r ty ’s  au thor i ty245 or obta in a
war ran t.246 In  sum, the  appar en t a ut hority r ule would excuse a
th i rd-par ty consen t  sea rch  only in t hose s itu at ions in  which  the
officer  cannot  be fau l t ed  for  the  mis take abou t  the  pe rson’s
au thor i ty  to consen t .
2. J ustifications for limited adoption of apparent auth ority
 Incorporat ing th e appa ren t a ut hority st an dar d as lim ited  by
the afore me nt ioned  pr oposal w ill re solve some of th e concern s
expressed  by critics of the rule. In addition, th e proposed
lim it a t ion s on  the rule are justified by the four ar guments th at
follow.
a. The proposed  stan dar d  is  closer by a nal ogy t o th e so-
called  “good  fa it h” excep ti on . In a series of cases beginn ing
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247. 468 U. S. 8 97 (1 984 ).
248. The exclusiona ry r ule “comma nds  th at  wher e eviden ce has  been obt ain ed in
viola tion  of the se ar ch an d seizu re pr otections  gua ra nt eed by th e U .S. C ons tit ut ion,
the illegally obt a in ed  ev id en ce  ca nnot  be  used  a t  the t r ia l of t he d efen da n t .” B LACK’S
LAW  DICTIONARY 564 (6th  ed. 1990). The  Un ited S ta tes S upr eme C ourt  held  t h a t  t he
s t ates  mu st a dhe re t o th e exclus iona ry r ule. S ee Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657
(196 1).
249. S ee St on e v.  Po we ll, 4 28 U .S.  465 , 48 6 (19 76) (“ Th e p ri ma ry  ju st ificat ion  for
the exclusionar y rule th en is the det erren ce of police con du ct t ha t vi olat es F our th
Amendmen t ri gh ts .”).
250. S ee Leon , 468 U.S. at 900.
251. S ee Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349S55 (1987) (refusin g to app ly th e
exc lus iona ry rule when  the police  reasonably  re li ed on  a  law passed  by  the  sta te
legi sl a tu re allowing for warr ant less searches because a  legislature cann ot be deterre d
by th e e xclu sio na ry  ru le).
252. S ee Ariz ona  v. Evans, 514 U.S. 2, 10S16 (1995) (refusin g to app ly th e
exc lus iona ry rule when t he police arrest ed the  de fendant  based  on  a  war ran t  tha t
err oneous ly sh owe d u p on  th e office r’s com pu te r d ue  to a  cler ica l er ro r).
253. S ee SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra  note 3, at  454S58.
254. However , even th ough t hir d-par ty consen t cas es ar e simila r t o the  good faith
excep tion  in  tha t th ey both r ely on a t hir d par ty, th ere is  a crit ical differen ce: in th e
good fait h e xcep tion , th e officer  is a llowe d t o ma ke  a r ea son a b le  m is t ake  of fact
because he  i s re lying on  a  neu tra l and  detached  th ird pa rt y (like a ju dge , or i n s ome
cases, even t he legis lat ur e). In m ost t hir d-par ty consen t cas es, th e th ird  pa r ty g iv ing
with  Uni ted  S ta tes  v.  Leon ,247 t he  Un i ted S ta t es  Supreme Cou r t
has ad opted  wha t h as  become kn own a s t he “good fait h”
exce pt ion . The  Cour t’s good faith  r u le essentially refuses to
ap ply th e exclusion ar y ru le24 8  t o evidence  ga the red  from
uncons t itu t iona l s ea rches when  the officer cond uct ing t he
sea rch  reasonably r elied on a neut ral third pa rty. The purpose
of th e exclusion ar y ru le is t o dete r comba tive, illega l ta ctics by
police;249 but , in si tua t ion s w her e t he p olice  rea son ably  rely  on a
neu t ra l t h ird  pa r ty,  li ke  a  magi st r a t e,250 th e legislatur e,251 or  a
computer  documen t  ge n er a t ed by cour t  au thor i ty252 for th eir
au thor i ty to sea rch ,  the just ifica tion  for th e exclusion ar y ru le
does not  ap ply beca us e jud ges an d legislatu res can not be
deter red  by ap plicat ion of th e exclus iona ry r ule . As a r esu lt, t he
Supreme Cour t  has  ap plied t he good fait h except ion in t he
limited  si tua t ion s in  wh ich  the office rs r ea son ably  reli ed  on an
in te rmed ia ry that  would n ot  be det er red  by a pp lica t ion  of th e
exclusiona ry ru le.253
The pr oposed a ppa ren t a ut hor ity s ta nd ar d a rt iculat ed in
th i s Comm ent  excuses  police cond uct  for a r eas on sim ilar  to
tha t  which  jus t ifi es  the Su pr em e Cour t ’s good fa it h  exce pt ion  to
the exclusiona ry ru le.254 In both situa tions, the police are
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consent  can  hardly qua li fy  as  neu t ra l a n d det ached . By definition , th e consen tin g
pa r ty purport edly shares a ccess to the propert y with the defendant a nd has a
rela tions hip  with the defendant  that  a neut ral and de t a ch ed de cision  ma ke r d oes n ot
have.  The th ird-party consenter  knows someth ing about th e property to be sear ched
because he ha s aut hority (or at least t he appa ren t  a u tho r ity ) t o  gran t  consen t  t o
sea rch  th e prope rt y “in his own r ight .” United  Sta tes v.  Ma tl ock , 415 U.S. 164, 171
n .7 (1974). As a result, officers should not be able to rely on the consent  of a t h i rd
p a r t y if ther e is an y rea sona ble doubt , after  an  int err ogation  of the t hir d par ty,  t h a t
the consenting part y has au thority to gra nt effective consent.
255. Massachuse t t s v. S he pp ar d, 4 68 U .S.  981 , 98 9 (19 84).
256. Cam pbell, supra  note 88, at  500.
excused wh er e t hey r ely  on a  th ir d p ar ty for  in format ion , bu t
only after  th ey tak e “every step  th at  could r easona bly be
expected of the m.”255 Similarly, in both the proposed  apparen t
au thor i ty standa rd and t he good faith exception, the police
cannot  be  fau lt ed  in  si tua t ion s w her e n o rea son able officer
would conclude  the fact s  to be any th ing  other  than  wh a t  t h ey
appear  to be to the officer. The police should not be pen alized
for  per formin g th eir  du ty w h e n  all evid en ce p oin t s t o the
val id ity  of t he  consen t  p roffe red  by  the  th ird  pa r ty.
b. The proposed  stan dar d  giv es p olice off icers t he pr oper
incentives. The p roper  incen t ive in  Four th  Amendment
ju r i sp rudence shou ld be for  offi ce r s i n doub t  t o get  a  war ran t ,
not  for  t h em to “rema in  ignoran t  a s  t o t he  impor t an t  factor s
t h a t  may be determinative of whether a  third par ty possesses
the re qu isit e comm on a ut hor ity t o cons en t t o a se ar ch.”256 The
proposed ap pa re nt  au th orit y st an da rd , by tigh te nin g th e
res t r ict ion s on  the a bil it y of police  to conduct a sear ch based on
th ird -pa r ty conse n t , gives  pol ice officers t his pr oper incent ive: if
t he re is any reasonable  doub t  a s t o t he  author i ty  of a  t h ird
pa r ty an d th e officer can not just ify th e sear ch under  an other
exce pt ion  to the  war ran t  cla use , t he office r  may n ot  rely  on the
appa rent  aut hority an d should inst ead obtain  a war ra nt .
Und er  th e Su pr eme  Cour t’s cur ren t a ppa ren t a ut hor ity
doctr ine, officer s h ave l it t le or  no incent ive to a sk  specific
ques t ions t o de termine the  au thor i ty of the  pe rson  g ran t ing
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257. Illinois  v. R odr igu ez,  497  U. S. 1 77,  188  (199 0) (qu oting Ter ry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21S22 (1 968 )).
258. Sh eppard, 468 U.S. at 989.
259. S ta t e v. L ar occo, 7 94 P .2d  460  (Ut ah  199 0).
260. S ee Sta te v. H ygh, 711  P.2 d 264, 272 (Utah 1985) (arguing that warra ntless
searches  should only be allowed to protect officer safety or preven t d est ru ction  of
evid en ce beca us e “[s]u ch a  re qu ir em en t w oul d p re se nt  lit tl e im ped im en t t o poli ce
investigations, es peci al ly in  ligh t of t he  ea se  wit h w hi ch wa rra nts can  be obtained
under  Ut ah ’s te lep ho ni c wa rr an t s ta tu te ”) (Zimm er ma n,  J ., con cur ri ng ).
261. La rocco, 794 P.2d at  470. As  a n  ex a m ple of the ea se with which an  officer
consen t ; in fa ct t he re  is t he  opposit e incen tive . Becau se t he y do
n ot  have to query the consenting part y’s auth ority unless “the
fact s ava ilab le t o th e officer  at  th e m omen t . . . ‘w a r ran t  a  man
of rea sonable caut ion in th e belief’ th at  th e consen tin g pa r ty
had au thor i ty over  th e pr em ises ,”257 t hey can  assume tha t  the
person g ran t ing au thor i ty has  the au th orit y. This a ssu mp tion  is
not  one  that  w il l often (if ever) lea d t o a jud ge’s cha mbe rs  in a n
e ffor t  t o p rocure  a  war ran t .
The p roposed s tandard,  on  the  other  hand, requ i res  the
officer  seek in g con se n t  from a  t h ird pa rt y to tak e “every step
tha t  could re a sonably be expected”258 of h im to asce r ta in  the
au thor i ty of t he consent ing par ty, an d th en h e ma y proceed
forward wit h  the s ea rch . In  effect , t he p ropos ed  ru le cr e a t es a
mild  p r es u m ption  th at  a t hir d pa rt y ha s n o au th orit y; this
pr esu mp tion  can  be overcom e wit h a  sh owing t ha t th e officer
conducted a  thorough  inves t iga t ion  of the th ird  pa r ty. Thus,  the
proposed rule is the better approach because it  safeguar ds the
defendan t ’s privacy interest a n d  a lso gives th e officer t he
incen tive  to ob ta in  a  war ran t  if the re i s doubt  as to the
au th orit y of the  th ird  pa rt y.
c. The proposed standa rd in vigorates the warrant
requirem en t. The Un it ed  St a tes  Su pr em e Cour t  has,  on
occasion , refu s ed  t o justify a war ra nt less sear ch because t he
officers had am ple time to secure a war ran t, and th ere was no
imm edia te  th rea t t ha t just ified th e war ra nt less sea rch .  The
Utah Supreme Court has a dopt e d the  same a t t itude and  has
esse nt ially held th at  when t here is t ime to obtain a wa rr an t
and no em ergency, officers should obtain a  warr ant . In
Larocco,259 th e Ut ah  Su pr eme  Cour t r eaffirm ed it s commi tment
to requ i re a  war ran t , not ing the  rela t ive ease wit h  wh ich  an
officer  can  ob ta in  one .260 The Utah  cour t  manda tes  a  war ran t
unless th ere is pr obable cause and exigent circumstan ces.261
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ C O O K -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
381] THIRD -PARTY CONSE NT TO SE ARCH 433
can  obtain a warr ant, th e Utah  Supreme Court  cited t o  the Ut ah st atu te th at a llowed
for  “the  is suance  of  a s ea rch  war ran t  based on  the  sworn  t elephon ic  st a t ement  o f t he
officer  seek ing t he w ar ra nt .” Id . (citing U TAH  CO D E  AN N . § 77-2 3-4(2 ) (198 2)).
262. This  i s n o t  to  sugges t  tha t  the  proposed  s tandard  i s a  new b r igh t -l ine  t e st .
Instead,  the proposal accepts the Supreme Court’s analysis  an d ju st ifica ti on  of th e
appa ren t  aut hority sta ndar d, but adds a n additional pr erequ isite: the officer must
cond uct  a thorough examination of the part y to test the party’s au t h o rity to consent .
If th at  in it ia l r equ ir em en t a nd  th e ot he r e lem en ts  of R odr igu ez  a r e  m e t , t h en  the
sea rch  is justified.
App lying th is  rea son in g t o the p ropos ed  app aren t  au thor it y
s tandard,  i f t he  offi ce r  ha rbor s  any doub t  a s t o t he  author i ty  of
the consenting part y in grant ing consent, the police should be
requ ired  to eit her  fin d ou t  for  cer t a in  wh et her  the p er son  has
au thor i ty , or  a lt e rna tive ly , ob ta in  a  war ran t .
d . The proposed standa rd is sim ilar to other bright-line
tests adopted  in  the Four th  Am endment arena . The pr oposed
s t anda rd wil l a lso en d s ome of the  confus ion  tha t  su r rounds  the
federal  a p pa r ent  au th ority ru le because it clar ifies an  officer’s
du ty with  respect t o obta ining valid th ird-par ty consent . In  tha t
r e spect , the proposal is clos er  t o a bright-line test:262 I f the
officer  shows  that  he ha s t ak en  all s te ps t ha t could  ha ve
reasonably been t ak en t o ensu re t he a ut hor ity of th e th ird
pa r ty an d noth ing points t o the a bsence of au th ority, then  th e
sea rch  is justified, even if it  l at e r  t u rns  ou t  t ha t  t he per son
lacked the  requ is it e  aut hor i ty.  Th is s t andard emphas izes  tha t
an  offi ce r  is  not  jus t ifi ed  under  the  apparen t  au thor i ty doct r ine
unless he h as  condu cted  an  exte ns ive int er roga tion  of t he  thi rd
pa r ty to a sse ss t he  pa rt y’s a u th orit y to consen t. Beca us e police
officers wou ld  know t hey h ave t he d u ty t o in ves t iga te befor e
assuming ap pa ren t a ut hor ity, t his  ru le would he lp  clea r  up
some of the  confus ion  sur rounding  th ird -par ty consen t  and
make app lica t ion  of the a pp aren t  au thor it y doct r in e m ore
pr edicta ble and  eas ie r  for  police to follow. Additiona lly, th is
s t anda rd compor t s wi th one  of t he  r easons  the Utah  Supreme
Cou r t  has d ecid ed  to sh un  fed er a l F our th  Amendment
s t andar ds in th e past , nam ely to simplify th e law an d to end
confusion a mong judges, th e bar , and  police officers.
3. Th e apparent authority stand ard h as m erit
 The proposal as sugge st ed  in  th is  Com men t  is  ba se d on  the
as su mp tion  tha t  th e apparent  auth ority doctrine is not so
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ C O O K -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
434 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
263. Pol ice officer s a tt em pt  to ob ta in con sen t for  sev er al r ea son s, for emos t  among
them  being that  the officer knows he lacks probable cause a nd th us cann ot get a
war ran t . S ee H OLTZ, supra  not e 28 , § 3.6,  at  337; see als o SAM AH A, supra  note 133,
a t  335.  In  ad dit ion,  an  officer  ma y wa nt  to con du ct a  cons e n t  search because even
th ough  he ha s probable cause, it is inconvenient to secure a  w a r r a nt ,  or  because  no
mag is t r a t e is available at th e time an d any delay might  dama ge the inves tiga tion . Id .
264. Massachuse t t s v. S he pp ar d, 4 68 U .S.  981 , 98 9 (19 84).
offensive  to Fourt h Amendment principles that  it  should be
complet ely abandoned. Inst ea d,  it  is  ba se d on  the a ss umpt ion
tha t  it  has i ts  pla ce in t he in vest igat ive pr ocess an d ben efits
bot h  the  pol ice  and thos e  w h o ar e ta rget s of police
investigations.263 The p roposed s ta nd ar d sim ply dr aws  th e line
in  a d iffe ren t  p lace  than  the United  S ta tes  Supreme Cour t  has
chosen t o draw it  and t hus s t r ik es  a  ba la nce bet ween  the t ota l
aboli t ion  of th e doctr ine espoused  by some cou r t s and
commenta tor s and  the nea r  freedom  of officer s t o rely on
apparen t aut hority that th e Supreme Court  seems to adopt.
By adoptin g a limited ver sion of th e appa ren t  au thor i ty
doctr ine, the U tah  Su pr em e Cour t  wou ld  pr omote t he efficie ncy
tha t  is inher ent  in consent  sea rch es in  gene ra l. In  ad dit ion, t he
proposed sta nda rd does n ot pun ish police officers  for doing th eir
job. If officers ta ke “every st ep th at  could r easona bly be
expected of th em”264 to en su re  th at  th e t hir d pa rt y consen tin g to
the sea rch  has  au thor i ty  to g ran t  t he conse n t , t he evid en ce
obtained  from the  se a r ch s hou ld n ot be su ppr esse d becau se it
l a te r tu rn s out t ha t t he consent ing par ty did n ot ha ve a ct ua l
au thor i ty to conse nt . Fin ally, i t  pr es er ves  the con st it u t ion a l
requ i rement tha t  a l l sear ches be condu cted rea sonably. If, after
conduct ing a  t horough  examina t ion  of t he  thi rd pa r ty,  the
police  ha ve no doubt as  to th e person’s au th ority, then  th e
pol ice can be sa id to ha ve acted reas ona bly—which is  all t he
Ut ah  Constit ut ion and  th e Unit ed Sta tes Const itut ion requir e.
V. CO N C L U S I O N
 Consent  by t h e  de fe n da n t  to sea rch  h i s p roper ty  has lon g
been r ecognized as a valid exception to the war ra nt
requ ir emen t ; however, un der t he Un ited St at es Sup rem e
Cour t ’s in terp re tat ion  of the Four th  Amendment ,  the defendan t
is not  the  on ly pe r s on  a u t h orized  to consen t t o a sea rch  of his
pr oper ty.  Oth ers wh o shar e comm on  a u thor i ty over  the
p rope r t y m ay als o gra nt  valid  consen t t o cond uct  a s ea rch . In
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265. S ee Hygh , 711 P . 2d  a t  272 (arguing tha t simpler r ules “might provide the
public  with greater and m ore consistent protection against unr easonab le  sea rches  and
seizures  by el im ina tin g m an y of th e con fus ing  excep tion s t o th e  w a rran t  r equ i r emen t
tha t  ha ve b ee n d eve lope d in  re cen t y ea rs ”).
fact , th e Su pr eme  Cour t h as  held  t h a t  even  if the  consen t ing
person  does  not  have actua l au thor i ty  to consen t , th e consen t is
valid  aga ins t  t he defendan t  if the police reasona bly believe the
pa rt y ha s a ut hor ity.
This  doct r ine of apparen t  aut h or i ty has  spawned  numerous
crit icisms  from commenta tors  and  has forced st at es t o look
closely at wheth er they should follow the federal sta ndar d or
provide defen da nt s in  th eir  s t a te with m ore protection by
in terpre t ing the ir  individua l constitutions to offer broader
protections. The U ta h Su prem e Cou r t  has expressed a
willingness and des ir e t o de ter min e whet her  to de pa r t  from
federa l th ird -par ty cons en t d octrin e, in s pit e of th e t ext ua l
s imi la r i ty between  the United  S ta tes  and  Utah  Cons t itu t ions .
Based  upon criteria used by th e Ut ah  Su pr eme  Cour t in
cases in  wh ich  the Cour t  de cided  to adop t i ts  own sea rch  and
se izure s t andard,  th is  Comment  a rgues tha t  t he Utah  Supreme
Cou r t  should incorpora te t he Matlock common au thor ity t est
in to th e Ut ah  Const itu tion , but  sh ould de cline to fu lly  adop t  the
federal  appa ren t a ut hority st an dar d. But, u nlike oth er s t a t es
tha t  have completely rejected t he  doct r ine of apparen t
au thor i ty , the Uta h Court should adopt  a  limit ed,  more
rest r ict ive version of th e cont roversial doctrin e th at  requ ires
pol ice officer s t o condu ct  a  t horough  examina t ion  of the
consen t ing th ird  pa r ty to t est  t he  consen t ing pa r ty’s  au thor i ty
befor e th ey may condu ct the sea rch. Doing so will allow t h ose
t ru ly r easonab le  mis t akes of fact  to pass s t a te cons t itu t iona l
mus ter , will r ein vigora te  th e wa rr an ts  clau se, a nd will end the
confusion  an d m isa pplica tion  a ssocia ted  with  the  federa l
apparen t  au t h ority st an dar d. By adopting t he pr oposed
stan dard,  Ut ah  will fulfill J us tice Zimm erman’s  des ir e  t o
sim plify sea rch  an d seizu re la w in U ta h. 265
S . M at th ew Cook
